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Abstract 
 
The ad hoc Offshore Accords of 2005 have fundamentally altered the landscape of 
regional redistribution and Equalization in Canada for the foreseeable future.  The fallout 
from the Accords has had an immediate impact on the functioning of the Equalization 
Program and the political factors that inform debate over future reforms.  Given the far-
reaching implications of these extra-formula arrangements, one must examine the 
circumstances that led to their signing.  To this end, this thesis examines the positions, 
process and politics that ultimately resulted in the February 2005 Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia Offshore Accords.  The major part of this thesis will compare the case of 
Saskatchewan to the cases of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. 
  Like Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan has made a bid for an Energy 
Accord that will protect the provinces energy revenues from the Equalization clawback.  
However, Saskatchewan has been unsuccessful at reaching a bilateral agreement with the 
federal government.  Several major factors prevented Saskatchewan from receiving an 
Energy Accord.  First, its position has been less consistent than those of Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia.  Saskatchewan has frequently adopted new positions based on 
pragmatism in order to maximize a possible Equalization deal.  Second, Saskatchewan 
faced an unfavourable political environment.  While Newfoundland and Nova Scotias 
federal electoral seats were critical for the Liberal Government in the 2004 federal 
election, Saskatchewan offered little in the way of political gain for Ottawa.  Moreover, 
once the 2005 Offshore Accords were signed, the rest of the country grew hostile to 
extra-formula deals, and thus, was not receptive to a Saskatchewan Energy Accord. 
Perhaps the most important finding concerned the long term implications that the 
2005 Offshore Accords will have on the credibility and effectiveness of the Equalization 
Program.  The Accords undermined the traditional processes, and have opened a possible 
Pandoras Box of ad hoc politically-motivated fiscal arrangements. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
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1. Why Equalize? 
The Equalization Program is a product of Canadian federalism.  In unitary systems, 
the central government has the ability to provide uniform public services and comparable 
rates of taxation for all regions in the country.  The Canadian Constitution assigns the 
provinces many spending responsibilities including health, education, and other social 
services.   However, economic capacities among provinces vary considerably.  
Consequently, provinces will be unable to provide equal levels of public services under 
equal taxation rates.1   
If provincial fiscal disparities remain uncorrected, net fiscal benefits (NFBs) 
differentials will emerge among provinces.  NFB is the difference between the value of 
public services received and the taxes paid by an individual residing in a particular 
province.  Differential NFBs create several problems.  First, NFB disparity can lead to 
increased migration.  People have an incentive to move to away from regions with lower 
NFB to provinces with higher NFB.  The outflow of people can further stunt economic 
growth of a province and increase the gap among NFBs.2   Second, unequal NFBs raise 
issues of fairness and equity.  Canadians should be entitled to a basic level of public 
services under a reasonable taxation load notwithstanding where in the country they 
choose to reside.  The Equalization Program is a policy instrument designed to reduce the 
disparities among provincial NFBs.        
In 1982, the Canadian commitment to Equalization became entrenched in the 
Constitution.  Section 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982 states: 
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(1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial 
legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their 
legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the 
government of Canada and the provincial governments are committed to 
(a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; 
(b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and 
(c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians 
(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of 
making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have 
sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at 
reasonably comparable levels of taxation.3 
 
In the narrowest sense, the Constitution commits Canadian governments to ensuring 
comparable services levels could be provided under comparable taxation burdens 
(Section 36 (2)).  However, Section 36 (1) expands the concept of Equalization to include 
the idea of regional opportunity and social citizenship.  Arguably the broader 
interpretation of 36(1) could be used to justify bilateral extra-formula Equalization 
agreements such the Offshore Accords between the federal government and both 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia (to be examined in Chapter 3).   
 The Canadian commitment was reflected in the May 2006 report issued by the 
Expert panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing.  The OBrien report 
describes Equalization as the heart of Canadas federation.  In many ways, 
Equalization reflects a strong Canadian commitment to fairness.  It has been described as 
the glue that holds our federation together.4  However, in spite of the wide recognition 
of the necessity of Equalization, little consensus exists as to the specifics of the 
Equalization formula.  As the OBrien reports suggests the saying the devil is in the 
details certainly rings true for Equalization.5 
 Equalization entitlements are determined by formula.  The formula uses 33 
revenue sources to measure the fiscal capacity of every province and determines the 
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appropriate Equalization transfer.  Among the most controversial aspects of Equalization 
is the treatment of natural resources in the Equalization formula used to redistribute 
federal resources to have not provinces. There are several reasons why natural 
resources have become a focal point for Equalization.  First, natural resources are a 
significant source of interprovincial economic disparities in Canada.  Second, the 
unpredictable and highly volatile resource revenues create problems of instability and 
affordability in the Equalization Program.  Fluctuating international prices for resources 
lead to large fluctuations of resource revenue entering the formula.  This translates into 
unpredictable and highly erratic Equalization transfers.  Not every province is endowed 
with the same natural resources.  Higher resource prices will lead to larger Equalization 
transfers to some provinces.  Thus, the overall cost of the Equalization Program increases 
causing problems of affordability.  In addition, proposals that suggest altering the aspects 
of the Equalization Program that affect natural resources will have very different 
financial impacts on various provinces.6  The contentious nature of natural resources and 
Equalization (to be further examined in Chapter 2) has played a determinative role in the 
historic evolution of the Equalization Program. 
 
 
2. Origins and Evolution of Equalization in Canada 
In the broadest sense, the informal practice of Equalization dates back to a series of 
post-Confederation federal grants and subsidies that were designed to offer more 
financial assistance to the Maritime Provinces than to Quebec and Ontario.7 Continuing 
into the 1930s the federal transfers were intendedthough not explicitlyto top off the 
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fiscal capacities of the Maritimes so that these provinces could provide similar levels of 
public services and taxation as those of central Canada.8   
 In 1927, the Rowell Sirois Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations 
articulated, for the first time, a need for a formalized Canadian system of Equalization.  
The Rowel Sirois report called for the implementation of National Adjustment Grants.  
The grants were to be, in fact, Equalization payments with the goal of achieving average 
standards of services in every province.  The National Adjustment Grants were to be 
reviewed every five years so as to be adjusted to meet changing provincial needs.9 
 In spite of the Rowell Sirois recommendations, the formal Equalization Program 
was not created until 1957.  Originally, the program used a top-two province standard.  
That is, the fiscal capacities of the two richest provinces were taken as the basis for 
Equalization.  In practice, the standard provided payments so that recipient provinces had 
revenues that equalled the average of the fiscal capacities of Ontario and British 
Columbia.  As a consequence, the top-two province standard ensured nine out of ten 
provinces would be entitled to an Equalization transfer (because one of the two provinces 
in the standard would also receive Equalization).   
Since 1957, the Equalization Program has been renewed and amended at regular 
five-year intervals.  Notable trends underlie all major formula alterations that have 
occurred between then and today.  First, most significant amendments have been efforts 
to control the overall cost of the program.  Second, as a result of cost-control efforts, 
most alterations have dealt with the treatment of natural resources in the Equalization 
formula because the dramatic price spikes of these revenues lead to higher Equalization 
payouts.  Today, 14 out of 33 revenue sources measured in Equalization refer to natural 
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resources.  As a result, natural resource revenue has created problems of unsustainable 
costs, unpredictability, and instability for the Equalization Program.  Most of the several 
notable changes to the Equalization formula since 1957 involve natural resources. 
 The amendments in 1962-1967 included the reduction of the natural resource 
inclusion rate from 100 percent to 50 percent.  In addition, the top-two province standard 
was replaced by a ten-province standard. These amendments were largely in response to 
resource-rich Alberta becoming a have not province, i.e., a recipient of Equalization.10  
 The next significant amendment to Equalization came in 1967. The Fiscal 
Arrangements Act of 1967 introduced the Representative Taxation System (RTS) formula.  
All provincial revenues (16 revenue sources in total) entered.  In order to determine an 
Equalization entitlement, the national average tax rate was calculated for each revenue 
source.  This average tax rate was then applied to each provinces revenue sources.  If the 
province was determined to have a revenue-raising capacity that surpassed the national 
average, it would not receive Equalization transfers.  If, however, the provinces revenue-
raising capacity were below the national average, then it would receive Equalization.  
The 1967 amendments also reinstated a 100 percent inclusion rate for natural resources.   
 In 1972 and 1973 the international price of oil increased sharply.  In response to 
growing Equalization costs, the federal government altered the scheme for equalizing 
energy revenue.  In 1974 Ottawa introduced an amendment that effectively distinguished 
between basic revenues (not attributed to the international energy disturbance) and 
artificial revenues (directly attributed to inflated global market prices).  Basic energy 
revenues were no longer equalized in full.  
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 The Fiscal Arrangements Act of 1977 again altered the treatment of natural 
resources.  The proportion of non-renewable resource revenues that entered the formula 
was changed to 50 percent.  Moreover, the proportion of total Equalization costs derived 
from resource revenues was capped to one-third of the entire program costs.   This 
provision is referred to as the natural resource override.  However, natural resources 
continued to cause problems.  Due to the high prices of oil and natural gas, Ontario 
qualified as a have not province for each year between 1977 and 1982.    In response, 
the federal government introduced the Personal Income Override in 1981.  The so-
called Ontario Ceiling disqualified any province from Equalization entitlements if the 
provincial personal income per capita exceeded the national average.  This provision only 
affected Ontario.  
 The 1982 amendments marked the last major revamping of the Equalization 
formula to date.  In efforts to control the costs of the program, the ten-province standard 
was replaced by a five-province standard (FPS).  Albertas energy revenues were driving 
the ten-province standard up.  In order to reduce the overall cost of the program, the 
federal government eliminated the income from the province with the greatest fiscal 
capacity, i.e, Alberta.  The amendment was balanced by the elimination of the provinces 
with the lowest fiscal capacity (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince 
Edward Island, and New Brunswick).  The five middle provinces remain in the 
standard: Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.   
The basic structure of the 1982 Equalization Program has not changed.  The RTS- 
FPS program has now been expanded to include 33 revenue sources. For each revenue 
source, a national average tax rate is calculated.  The standard is determined by applying 
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this national tax rate for a particular revenue source to the average per capita revenue in 
the five standard provinces.   In order to determine the Equalization entitlement, the 
national average tax rate is applied to the provinces own per capita tax base for that 
source.  If the entitlement is negative, the province is a have province for that particular 
revenue source.   If the entitlement is positive, than the province is a have not for the 
revenue source. Most provinces will possess both have and have not revenue sources.  
Even Alberta which has the largest negative entitlementis determined to be a have 
not province with respect to some of the 33 revenue sources.  In order to determine the 
final Equalization transfer, each provinces 33 negative and positive entitlements are 
added together.   If the aggregate is positive, the province is a have not province and 
will receive an Equalization payment.  If the aggregate is negative, the province is a 
have province and gets nothing.    It is important to note that the Canadian Equalization 
Program equalizes up but it does not equalize down.  That is to say that if a province 
is determined to be a have province, it is not required to make a direct payment into the 
program. 
The Equalization Program is funded by the federal government.  Federal tax 
dollars are used to finance transfers.  However, some provincesespecially have 
provincespoint out that Equalization is indirectly funded on the backs of have 
provinces.  This argument, as advocated by Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty, points 
out that have not provinces recuperate a portion of their tax monies through 
Equalization transfers.  Conversely, when residents of have provinces pay taxes to the 
federal government, none of the revenue is returned by way of the Equalization Program.  
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As a result, have provinces have a vested interest in containing the overall cost of the 
program.11 
The operation of Canadas Equalization Program creates a phenomenon referred 
to as a clawback.  When a province experiences an increase in revenue from one of the 
33 sources, its fiscal capacity according to the Equalization formula will increase.  
Therefore, the Program will decrease the provinces Equalization entitlement by an 
amount that corresponds to the increase.  The amount of the decrease in Equalization 
entitlements is the Equalization clawback.  The clawback of natural resources is the 
subject of the subsequent case studies. 
 
3. Process 
The Equalization Program has been renewed every five years since its creation in 
1957.  The negotiation process begins immediately following the previous renewal, and 
participants include various permutations of bureaucrats, cabinet members, and 
sometimes First Ministers.   While the process is generally inclusive in the sense that all 
provinces have the opportunity to make suggestions and present a case for amendments, 
ultimately, the decision is always made by the federal government.   
  There have been two marked aberrations from the five-year renewal process.  The 
first occurred in 1985 and 1986 when Newfoundland and Nova Scotia signed the bilateral 
Atlantic Accords with the federal government.  These Accords afforded the two 
provinces special provisions pertaining to their offshore oil revenue.  The Atlantic 
Accords will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  The second occurred in 2005 
when these same provinces signed renewed agreements on offshore oil with Ottawa.   
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These agreements entitled, Arrangement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador on Offshore Revenues and the Arrangement 
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of Nova Scotia on Offshore 
Revenues, were signed in February 2005.    The treatment of Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia energy resources marks a significant departure from traditional Equalization 
practices.  Throughout the tumultuous history of natural resources in the Equalization 
formula, most of the changes occurred within the traditional five-year review process.  
However, the new Offshore Accords were negotiated and signed outside of the 
Equalization renewal process which terminated with the amendments of 2004.  
Furthermore, both the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords and the 2005 Offshore Accords 
were negotiated with only two provinces, outside of the normal review process. 
 
 
4. Focus and Objectives 
  The ad hoc Offshore Accords of 2005 have fundamentally altered the landscape of 
regional redistribution and Equalization in Canada for the foreseeable future.  The fallout 
from the Accords has had an immediate impact on the functioning of the Equalization 
Program and the political factors that inform debate over future reforms.  Given the far-
reaching implications of these extra-formula arrangements, one must examine the 
circumstances that led to their signing.  To this end, this thesis will examine the positions, 
process and politics that ultimately resulted in the February 2005 Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia Offshore Accords.  The major part of this thesis will compare the case of 
Saskatchewan to the cases of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. The first objective of these 
case studies is to determine how these cases depart from the traditional principles of 
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Equalization.  Like Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan has made a bid for an 
Energy Accord that will protect the provinces energy revenues from the Equalization 
clawback.  However, unlike Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan has been 
unsuccessful at reaching a bilateral agreement with the federal government.  The second 
objective of the thesis is to discover what factors led to Newfoundlands and Nova 
Scotias success and Saskatchewans failure.  Again, the Saskatchewan case will 
highlight the positions of the participants, process of negotiations, and the political 
motivations to discover the key events and circumstances that influenced the 
unsuccessful outcome for Saskatchewan. 
 
5. Methodology and Organizational Structure 
 This thesis uses the case study method to highlight key issues and problems with 
the modern configuration of the Equalization Program.  The cases have been informed 
primarily by journal articles, government-initiated studies, government documents, and 
newspapers.  Interviews with government officials provide additional information about 
facts that were not in the public domain. 
 This thesis looks at three major elements in the cases of Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia and Saskatchewan.  The first focus is positions.  The negotiating positions of each 
of the provinces, as well as the federal government will be explained and analyzed.  The 
second aspect is process.  The thesis will examine the process of negotiations that led to 
the Offshore Accords for Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, and the process which failed to 
deliver an energy accord for Saskatchewan.  The third focus will be on the politics that 
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affected each case.  There were clearly many political factors that influenced the 
provincial and the federal governments. 
 Chapter 2, Natural Resources and Equalization, looks at the problem of the 
Equalization clawback as it pertains to natural resources.  These issues provide the 
foundation for the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Accords, and the Saskatchewan 
argument for its own Accord.   
 Chapter 3, The Cases of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, looks at the specific 
factors that led to the 2005 Offshore Accords.  The chapter examines the positions of 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Ottawa.  It also deals with the bilateral and ad hoc 
process that led to the signing of the Offshore Accords.  Finally, the chapter will discuss 
some of the political factors that motivated the actors determined the outcomes. 
 Chapter 4, The Case of Saskatchewan, looks at the case of Saskatchewan.  Like 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan has a history of grievances concerning 
the treatment of its energy revenues in the Equalization formula.  This chapter examines 
the positions of Saskatchewan and the federal government; the process through which 
negotiations occurred; and the political factors that influenced the negotiations.  Chapter 
4 concludes with observations about the general differences between the Saskatchewan 
case and the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia cases. 
 The final chapter, Conclusion, broadens the analysis to consider the overall 
Equalization Program.  It will examine the possible long term implications that arise out 
of the two cases.  It will also make recommend a prescription for reform of the 
Equalization Program. 
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Chapter 2: Natural Resources and Equalization 
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 Since the creation of the modern Equalization Program in 1957, natural resources 
revenues have consistently proven to be the most contentious program issue. The 
treatment of resource revenues has been the source of the majority of major amendments 
and remodeling that affected Equalization over the last five decades. Rising oil prices and 
increasing oil revenue have accentuated the problems of Equalization and natural 
resources; particularly for Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan.12 Indeed, it is 
the issue of natural resources that has created the current Equalization energy controversy.  
The Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore agreements emanate directly from the 
perpetual struggle between natural resource rents and Equalization entitlements.  In the 
energy agreements, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia managed to increase their share of 
the net profits from offshore revenue after Equalization has been calculated.  
Saskatchewan is pursuing a similar arrangement.   
 In order to understand the context of the current energy revenue disputes, it is 
important to understand why natural resources create controversy in the Equalization 
Program.  If natural resources are to be treated differently than other provincial revenue 
sources, which has often been the case over the history of Equalization, the nature of 
these revenues must be unique.  This chapter explores the proposition that natural 
resources are indeed different from other revenues.  The explanation focuses specifically 
on nonrenewable natural resources.   The contemporary debate involves four major 
factors: the clawback, ownership, asset liquidation, and incentives.  These factors are the 
base on which the governments of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan make 
their claims for special treatment of energy revenue in the Equalization formula. 
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1. The Clawback 
 Many of the problems caused by natural resources originate in the clawback 
phenomenon.  The clawback is a phenomenon relevant to the 33 tax bases used in the 
Equalization formula.  The calculation employs a Representative Taxation System (RTS) 
to determine the fiscal capacity of each province.  The RTS calculates each of the 10 
provinces potential revenue from 33 revenue sources.  Once a provinces revenue raising 
capacity is measured, it is compared to the national standard.  Currently, Equalization 
uses a Five-Province Standard (FPS), which relies on the average fiscal capacities of 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec to determine the 
national standard.13  For each tax base the provinces revenue potential is measured 
against the FPS.  If the provinces taxation capacity exceeds the FPS, the province is a 
have province for that particular revenue base.  Conversely, if the taxation capacity is 
below the FPS, the province is a have-not province for that revenue base.  When the 
cumulative revenue-raising capacity for all 33 tax bases falls below the FPS, the overall, 
the province is a have not province and receives Equalization transfers to top off 
provincial capacity to the standard. 
 One of the most important consequences of using a RTS formula-based 
approach14 is the clawback effect. When government income from a revenue category 
increases, a have not province gains new revenue, and its fiscal capacity will increase.  
Because the province then enjoys a larger fiscal capacity, it moves closer to the standard.  
Therefore, every new dollar raised by a province will decrease the provinces overall 
Equalization entitlement.  Due to the clawback, for a have not province, new revenue 
often results in little or no new money in provincial coffers.   
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  The clawback is only a problem for have not provinces and those that are just 
above the have line.  The clawback is of little concern for provinces that comfortably 
exceed the have threshold because these provinces do not receive Equalization 
transfers. The clawback is resented by the affected provinces.  These provinces find 
themselves in a situation where significant economic growth does not lead to real revenue 
growth.   
 While the clawback is imposed on all 33 tax bases, have not provinces 
particularly resent its impact on nonrenewable natural resources.  These provinces assert 
that these resource rents are somehow special, therefore they should not be subject to the 
clawback.  The rest of the chapter will explore the relationship between the clawback and 
nonrenewable natural resources.  
1.1         Generic Solution 
The federal government introduced the Generic Solution in 1994 in an attempt to 
deal with some of the undesirable consequences of the clawback.  The federal 
government cites the potential for provinces to manipulate their taxation policies as the 
reason for the Generic Solution.  Because Equalization is calculated according to the 
average national tax rates of all 10 provinces, entitlements directly relate to changes in 
the national taxation averages.  Under most circumstances, when a province changes its 
tax rates, no significant movement in the national average will occur.  However, when a 
particular tax base is concentrated within one province only, this province can 
significantly affect the national standard.  In fact, in some instances when a province 
possesses the entire tax base, its own tax rate will be the lone determinant of the national 
standard.  In these circumstances, one provinces taxation choices can significantly 
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distort the entire Equalization calculation of a particular revenue source.  Moreover, a 
province may choose inefficient taxation policies in order to maximize its Equalization 
transfer. 15  For example, if a province arbitrarily lowers the national average by setting 
its tax rates too low, it will minimize its clawback at no short-term cost to provincial 
revenue after the clawback.16 
In order to reduce negative taxation incentives, the Generic Solution reduces the 
clawback for those provinces that possess more than 70 percent of the national tax base.  
For the qualifying provinces, the clawback of the affected tax base is reduced to 70 
percent of the provincial revenue.  Therefore, the province is always guaranteed to retain 
30 percent of its revenue after the clawback.  Because the province will still keep a 
portion of its revenue, it will have increased incentive to introduce economically efficient 
taxation policies on the base in order to maximize net provincial revenue. 
In practice, the Generic Solution has two arbitrary effects.  The first problem is 
that Ottawa has the discretion to create, combine, and eliminate tax bases.  For example, 
when Ottawa created a separate category for offshore oil it allowed Newfoundlands 
energy revenue to qualify for the Generic Solution.  Likewise, when Ottawa combined 
potash into a new category for minerals in general, it disqualified Saskatchewans potash 
revenue from the Generic Solution.  Provincial clawback relief is completely subject to 
the will of the federal government.17 
The second arbitrary effect of the Generic Solution is the inconsistency in the 
calculation process.  While the Equalization entitlements and clawbacks are determined 
using a five province base, eligibility for the generic solution is determined using all ten 
provinces.  This discrepancy creates some arbitrary and unfavorable consequences for 
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provinces that are members of the FPS.  This incongruity is explored in Chapter 4 in 
discussing Saskatchewans energy revenues.18   
1.2      Atlantic Accords of 1985 and 1986 
Like the Generic Solution, the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords reduce clawbacks for 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  However, while in principle the Generic Solution deals 
with all 33 revenue sources, the Atlantic Accords are limited to offshore oil.  The Atlantic 
Accords consist of two bilateral agreements between the federal government and each of 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  The Accords were not exclusively concerned with 
Equalization.  They involved jurisdictional and administrative arrangements for the 
exploitation of offshore oil fields.19  The Newfoundland Offshore Accord and the Nova 
Scotia Offshore Accord were signed in 1985 and 1986 respectively.   
The stated purpose of the Accords was to provide transitional protection from the 
clawback and allow offshore development.  The clawback protection lasted 12 years for 
Newfoundland and 10 years for Nova Scotia.  The Accords consisted of two main 
components.  The first provision was an offset floor, which guaranteed the two provinces 
a certain percentage of their Equalization transfer from the previous year.  That 
percentage was 95, 90, or 80 percent, depending on the provincial fiscal capacity relative 
to other provinces.  The second component was a phase-out process.  The phase-out 
process allowed the clawback to be reduced by declining percentages over the existence 
of the Accord (12 years in Newfoundland and 10 years in Nova Scotia). 20  
 In terms of the Equalization of natural resources, the Atlantic Accords contain 
three notable implications.  Firstly, Equalization agreements were made bilaterally, and 
outside of the regular renegotiation process.  The negotiation involved only two parties; 
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Ottawa-Newfoundland in one case and Ottawa-Nova Scotia in the other, at the exclusion 
of all other provinces and territories.  This kind of bilateral process was unprecedented 
under the Equalization program.  Secondly, the very existence of the Accords conceded 
that nonrenewable resource revenues, at least offshore oil, warrant special treatment.  
Thirdly, the Accords set a precedent for extra-formula amendments to the Equalization 
program.  Prior to the 1980s, most major changes in the program occurred within the 
context of multilateral formula adjustments.  The Atlantic Accords, however, modify 
Equalization entitlements outside of the formula.   
 
2.       Provincial Ownership 
 The continued existence of a confiscatory clawback creates other objections to the 
Equalization framework of natural resources.  One of the most common objections falls 
under jurisdictional terms.  Section 92 (2) Constitution Act, 1982 reaffirms provincial 
ownership of natural resources.  Furthermore Section 125 states that two levels of 
government cannot tax the others lands or property.  Therefore, some argue that the 
Constitution forbids the federal government from taxing provincially owned resources.  
Proponents of this argument reason that the Equalization clawback effectively constitutes 
a backdoor tax on provincial resource revenues.  Therefore, the argument reasons that 
any resource clawback is unconstitutional. 
 The Constitution, however, also contains provisions that complicate the 
jurisdiction arguments.  Section 36 of the Constitution Act 1982 assigns to the federal 
government the responsibility of Equalization of provincial revenues.  The obvious clash 
between Section 12521 and Section 36 demands compromise.22  The essential question is 
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can the federal government infringe on provincial jurisdiction (natural resources) when 
the greater national good is at stake.   
 The limits of provincial ownership rights and jurisdiction of taxation of Section 
92 have been twice tested by the Supreme Court.  The first case, Canadian Industrial Oil 
and Gas Ltd. (CIGOL) v. The Government of Saskatchewan et al. (1977), challenged 
Saskatchewans then existing taxation structure, designed to capture the new resource 
rents caused by a spike in international oil prices. The government of Canada intervened 
on the side of CIGOL, in an attempt to limit provincial jurisdiction concerning natural 
resources that are intended for sale inter-provincially or internationally. The Court 
declared Saskatchewans actions ultra vires on the grounds that (1) the actions 
constituted indirect taxation and were therefore violating Section 92, and (2) the actions 
affected interprovincial trade and therefore infringed on federal jurisdiction. In a 7-2 
decision the Supreme Court ruled on behalf of CIGOL, implying that Saskatchewans 
ownership to oil rents was limited by virtue of Section 92 (2), trade and commerce.23     
 The next case that restricted the reach of Section 92 is Central Canadian Potash 
Corp. (CCPC)  v. the Government of Saskatchewan.  Central Canadian Potash Corp 
challenged the Saskatchewan governments pro-rationing scheme that fixed the price of 
potash.  Viewing the case to be of significant importance, the government Canada took 
the unprecedented initiative of applying for co-plaintiff status.  Again the Supreme Court 
ruled against Saskatchewan.  While the provinces retain ownership over their resources, 
they are limited in what they do with these possessions. 
The net effect of CIGOL and CCPC is that provincial ownership over natural 
resources can be limited by a variety of external factors.  The court cases allowed Ottawa 
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to assume natural resource jurisdiction under Sections 91 and 92 (2), trade and commerce.  
These limitations open possibilities to further limitations to provincial ownership rights 
for the national interest, i.e. Equalization.      
The controversy and provincial resentment resulting from CIGOL and CCPC led 
to the further clarification of provincial resource ownership and jurisdictional rights in the 
1981 round of constitutional negotiations.  The result was Section 92(A).24  This section 
provides for provincial jurisdiction in the exploration, development, and conservation of 
natural resources.  However, Section 92(A) favors federal government involvement in the 
resource sectors:  
Nothing in subsection (2) derogates from the authority of Parliament to enact laws 
in relation to the matters referred to in that subsection and, where such a law of 
Parliament and a law of a province conflict, the law of Parliament prevails to the 
extent of the conflict.25 
 
The addition of Section 92(A) did little to enforce provincial ownership rights.  In fact, 
the section appears to have opened the door to other cases of indirect federal dipping into 
resource rents.  The strengths and limitations of 92(A) have yet to be challenged at the 
Supreme Court level. 
 In light of the apparent limitations of 92(A) it is possible to argue that provincial 
ownership rights do not prevent indirect federal taxation through Equalization clawbacks.   
Robin Boadway argues that the principles of Section 36 take precedence over provincial 
ownership rights.  Nothing in Sections 92 or 125 expressly assigns resource rents to the 
provinces.  Furthermore, the historic understanding of the nature of Equalization 
necessitates the surrender of some ownership rights.  Therefore, Boadway concludes that 
the Equalization commitments in 36(2) trump ownership entitlements.26  While 
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Boadways conclusion in the paramountcy of Section 36 has yet to be tested in court, the 
legacy of CIGOL and CCPC certainly weakens the provincial ownership argument. 
 
3. Development of an Asset 
When the natural resource in question is nonrenewable, provincial ownership issues 
become more complex.  Ken Boessenkool and the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies 
(AIMS) argue that the sale of a non-renewable resource is like converting a provincial 
asset. Collecting royalties from a non-renewable resource is unlike other revenue 
collection.  The transaction simply converts a physical asset to a financial asset.   
Nonrenewable resource royalties are not a rent; they are only the liquidation of an asset 
that the province has possessed since it was created.27  Nonrenewable resource revenues 
are one-time in nature, and therefore the owners of the asset must retain those profits.  
Because the Constitution assigns resources as a provincial domain, the provinces should 
be able to keep all of the rent from the sale of nonrenewable natural resources.28 
 Boadway adamantly refutes this argument.  He bases his argument on the premise 
that nonrenewable resources are located in particular provinces by virtue of chance alone.  
Therefore natural resource revenues represent a source of revenues like any other source, 
except that some provinces are luckier than others with respect to their endowments.29  
The resource-endowed province receives rents for its nonrenewable assets, even if the 
resource is being depleted in the process.  These resources are a free source of funding 
for public services, thereby directly raising the capacity of the provinces public service 
delivery. Therefore, it seems bizarre to accept the proposition that such a windfall gain 
should not be taxed similarly to earned income.30 
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4. The Incentive Argument 
On a functional level, the Equalization of natural resource revenue may have a 
negative effect on provincial economic policy choices.  As the Director of Research 
Services for AIMS asserts: Equalization was not a program developed to promote 
economic growth, but it certainly does not exist to stunt or hinder prosperity.31  Others 
argue that Equalization should affect a broader convergence of provincial fiscal 
capacities.32  However, critics of the program suggest that not only is Equalization not 
providing the necessary assistance to have not provinces, but it is actually stifling 
economic opportunities.  This argument suggests that the formula has inadvertently built 
in particular incentives that can hinder economic development in recipient provinces.  
Because resource revenues are clawed back completely in the absence of a special 
agreement or the Generic Solution, provincial governments have little incentive to 
develop these industries.  Furthermore, the formula fails to recognize the costs incurred 
by a government in the resource-development process.  As a result, after infrastructure 
and incentive programs, the government may be financially worse off by pursuing 
economic development in the field of its nonrenewable natural resources.33 
4.1    Costs and Revenue Potential 
One of the contributing factors to a structural disincentive is the manner that 
revenue is calculated.  Currently, gross resource revenues typically enter the Equalization 
formula.  However, calculations using gross revenue do not take into account a variety of 
costs involved in developing and exploiting natural resources.  Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to use net revenues, i.e., the revenues that are left over after the government 
expenses to develop and collect the resource rents in question.  This argument implies 
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that natural resource revenues are unique in nature.  They require government investment 
in transportation infrastructure, environmental assessment and monitoring costs and 
policy costs.  Once the resource industry is thriving the government incurs collection, 
assessment and auditing costs on the taxation side.  Resource revenues may also involve 
administration costs.34   
For other revenue sources, some of the same costs exist.  However, since these 
revenue bases are common to every province, the impact of ignoring these costs is 
limited.  Natural resources are unique because it is only possible for certain provinces to 
generate resource rents.  Therefore, only some provinces bear the additional expenditures 
associated with industry development.  Furthermore, even among provinces that have 
access to natural resources, the developmental and extraction costs can vary.  The leader 
of the Saskatchewan Party, Brad Wall, explains this phenomenon as it relates to 
Saskatchewan: 
Significant infrastructure is required to extract it [oil] and to develop the industry.  
In ours here, we have a unique challenge, by the way.  Well, its not unique, but 
its a challenge that certainly most of Alberta doesnt have in this regard, and it is 
that our oil is not quite as sweet and is not quite as light, so typically its not as 
easy to access.  There are infrastructure requirements and theres a capital 
investment requirement that is very significant.  I think thats why others, more 
than politicians, are now saying it is time for us to look at the whole question of 
whether non-renewable resources ought to be in the equalization formula.35 
 
According to this argument, it is inequitable to use gross revenue instead of net revenue.  
The net measure would take into account the costs required to generate resources 
revenue.36 
 Using gross revenues can result in significant overestimation of provincial income 
from a source.  In real terms, the overestimation leads to striking Equalization penalties.  
For example, John McDougalls book on Erik Kierans points out that the Quebec 
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Revenue Minister found that provinces expenditures in support of the resource 
outweighed its income.  However, in 1967 when resource revenues were brought into 
Equalization, Quebecs gross income resulted in a negative entitlement.  Therefore, 
Equalization functioned to increase the net revenue loss from Quebecs resource sector.37  
4.2     Natural Resource Development Incentives 
Excessive clawbacks punish provinces for the responsible development of their 
nonrenewable natural resources.  As a result, recipient provinces have little incentive to 
reduce their reliance on Equalization in favor of developing their resource industries.  
Equalization builds in a moral hazard that reduces the incentive for rigorous 
developmental policies among have not provinces.  Hubert Grubel describes how have 
not provinces react to the moral hazard:  
Rational Adjustment occurs when adjustments are undertaken by the insured in 
response to changes in relative prices.  For example, the owners of insured homes 
receive less return from measures to prevent break-ins.  So they are less likely to 
install alarms, keep watchdogs or trim hedges.38  
 
The expended resources and effort required to breathe life into a new resource industry 
cannot be offset by the net profits after clawbacks from the Equalization Program.  
Instead of encouraging economic growth of resource-rich have not provinces, the 
formula actually creates incentives to slow or stall development.  While provinces 
probably would not take steps to proactively stifle resource industries, they certainly will 
be less inclined to offer the financial resources required to encourage their growth 
 In the case of taxation incentives set up to encourage private-sector investment, 
the Equalization clawback can result in a net loss of provincial revenues. If a province 
derives revenue at a rate that is less than the national average, an increase in fiscal 
capacity results in a clawback that exceeds the new revenue.  For have not provinces, 
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taxation rates that are lower than the national rate will create a net loss in overall revenue.  
Conversely, provinces that tax at a rate that exceeds the national average will enjoy an 
overall increase in net revenue.  Therefore, the formula discourages preferential taxation 
rates that would encourage the development of a provincial resource sector.39 Overall, the 
formula creates disincentives for provinces to incur the costs of infrastructure, taxation, 
and administration, which would encourage the development of a resource sector.  
Consequently, have not provinces are enticed to remain recipients of Equalization 
instead of taking the steps required to build their economies. 
The main opponent of the incentive argument is Robin Boadway who states 
there is no evidence that equalization tax-backs have deterred provinces from pursuing 
resource development.40  Boadway points to the oil industry in Saskatchewan and 
mining in Manitoba as examples of recipient provinces that have vigorously exploited 
their resources.  Furthermore, once a nonrenewable resource is discovered in a province, 
all potential development will always be subject to a clawback.  Therefore, it is only a 
matter of when the resource is exploited instead of if it will be exploited.  Since the 
clawback will occur eventually, provincial governments have no incentive to postpone 
the development of the industry.41 
 Boadways argument has significant holes.  First, contrary to his suggestion, there 
are several cases where evidence has pointed to the Equalization implications as the 
reasons why provincial governments have chosen to pass up opportunities to develop 
their natural resources.  Notable cases occurred in Newfoundlands treatment of Incos 
bid to develop a mineral deposit at Voiseys Bay.42  Voiseys Bay will be further 
discussed in the following section. 
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 Secondly, Boadway makes the hasty assumption that the perpetual existence of 
clawbacks will cause provinces to rigorously pursue the development of natural resources.  
In order to foster the growth of some industries, the government may have to incur 
significant developmental costs.  This is especially true when a large amount of 
infrastructure is required.  In such a scenario, the loss in net revenues due to clawbacks 
discourages governments from providing healthy conditions for economic development. 
If, for whatever reason, the price of the commodity drops, or circumstances change, the 
province could have lost its chance to extract the greatest economic rent from the 
resource.  Boadway does not give enough credence to the fact that provincial 
governments will be cost-adverse, while resource development is often expensive.   
4.3 Real Effects 
The case of Voiseys Bay in Newfoundland shows how the disincentive may 
impact provincial behavior.43  In the late 1990s, Inco put in a bid to the government of 
Newfoundland to develop the nickel deposits in Voiseys Bay.   Incos proposal included 
investments of $750-million immediately in a mine and mill, and a further $95-million in 
underground exploration, plus a $180-million experiment to see whether local chemical 
processing of the ore was feasible.44  After protracted negotiations, Inco pulled out and 
invested instead in Argentina.45  
There are several possible reasons for Premier Brian Tobins reluctance to close 
the deal.  Tobin wanted Incos nickel extraction to be accompanied by a smelting plant in 
Newfoundland.  Many observers speculate that Premier Brian Tobin did not offer the 
incentives required to secure Incos investment in Newfoundland because of the short 
term repercussions of the Equalization Program.46  If Inco were to invest in a have 
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province, the province would reap all of the benefit from the development.  However, 
because Newfoundland is a have not province, all of the revenue generated by an Inco 
development would be subject to a clawback in excess of 80 percent.47  Therefore, a 
development that would create $100-million of new wealth in a have province would 
create less than $20-million in Newfoundland. The result is that Premier Tobin had every 
incentive to hold out for the smelting plant and the jobs.48  As an article in the Globe and 
Mail pointed out during the negotiations:  
Equalizations spectre whispers constantly in Mr. Tobins ear, Go for the jobs. 
Its the only way to make Voiseys Bay pay off for him, despite the fact that the 
project is now stalled and Canada already has excess processing capacity.  Thus 
do equalizations good intentions make fools of us all.49 
 
If the clawback ramifications influenced Premier Tobins negotiations, the Equalization 
Program is not functioning as it was originally intended. The disincentives of the 
clawback work against one of the core objectives of the Equalization Program: 
promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; [and] furthering 
economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities.50  If  Equalization is actively 
quashing economic opportunities, significant changes must be considered.51 
 
5.     Conclusion 
Natural resources appear to bring about unique challenges to the Equalization 
program.  Bruce Winchester suggests that (w)e treat natural resource revenues very 
unintelligently because we forget that they are fundamentally different from almost every 
other kind of government revenue.  Not just a slice off the top: Actually nonrenewable.52  
The Economic Council of Canada also recognizes a distinctiveness that characterizes 
natural resources.  In its 1982 report, the Council suggested that it is only appropriate to 
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subject a portion of natural resources to Equalization. The Conservative Partys 2004 and 
2006 election platform contained promises to remove nonrenewable natural resources 
from Equalization completely.  
If nothing else, the perception that natural resources are unlike other revenue has 
caused a chorus of objections and proposals.  The Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 
agreements on offshore oil were a response to the clawback of natural resource revenue. 
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Chapter 3: The Cases of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 
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 Since the 1960s, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have fought continuous battles 
with Ottawa over the revenue and control of offshore oil.  The struggle involves much 
more than Equalization; it also encompasses jurisdictional and administrative issues.   
While the Canada Oil and Gas Land Regulations and the British Columbia Offshore 
Reference Case confirm federal jurisdiction over offshore oil, Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia claim the right to shield offshore rents from the Equalization clawback.53  
 In 1966, the first East Coast deep drilling program began 100 miles off the shores 
of Newfoundland.  In 1967, the Sable Island drilling began, off thke coast of Nova 
Scotia.54  The emerging energy industry renewed the efforts of Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia to secure jurisdictional authority and administrative control over offshore 
developments.  The introduction of the National Energy Program in 1980 intensified the 
dissatisfaction in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia about the offshore energy regime.   
The federal government reached a bilateral agreement in principle with Nova 
Scotia in March 1982.  The proposal included shared administration and control over the 
oil fields.  It also increased Nova Scotias share of oil revenues.  Not willing to 
compromise over jurisdictional issues, Newfoundland refused to join the negotiation 
process. In May 1982, Prime Minister Trudeau announced that Canada would take the 
Newfoundland offshore jurisdiction issue to the Supreme Court.  Recognizing that the 
Supreme Court precedents favored the federal government in the past, Newfoundland 
reopened negotiations.  In September 1982, Newfoundland agreed to an offshore 
arrangement that mirrored the one adopted by Nova Scotia.55  The Canada-Nova Scotia 
Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Management and Revenue Sharing and the 
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Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource 
Management and Revenue Sharing were used as bases for formulating the official 
Accords.  The final Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Accords were officially signed in 
1985 and 1986 respectively.  Together, the two agreements are referred to as the Atlantic 
Accords.56 
The Atlantic Accords are wide reaching agreements that deal with administrative 
structures, revenue sharing, Equalization clawbacks, and jurisdictional questions 
regarding offshore oil.  Equalization was only one component of the Atlantic Accords.  
The Equalization provisions ensured that Newfoundland and Nova Scotia would initially 
receive all of the offshore revenues save the federal share of corporate income tax.  The 
provinces would continue to receive this share of revenues until they reach a level of 
fiscal and economic prosperity that invokes the trigger.  The trigger required the 
provincial fiscal capacity to be 123 percent of the national average. Moreover, for every 
percentage point that the provincial unemployment rate surpassed the national rate, the 
fixed trigger rate would increase by two points.  The trigger created a significant shelter 
for the offshore rents of both provinces.57 
In order to ensure that Newfoundland and Nova Scotia remained the primary 
beneficiaries of the energy revenues as long as the trigger had not been activated, the 
Atlantic Accords provided offset payments.  The federal government promised to provide 
payments to reimburse Newfoundland and Nova Scotia for future Equalization clawbacks 
relating to offshore rents.  The offset payments topped off the provincial Equalization 
transfer to a level equivalent to 90 percent of the previous years transfer.  The offset 
mechanism was to last for ten years in Nova Scotia, and 12 years in Newfoundland.58   
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In spite of the Atlantic Accords, by 2000 neither Newfoundland nor Nova Scotia 
had reached the level of economic prosperity that was forecasted in the 1980s.  Upon the 
signing of the Atlantic Accords, then Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources of 
Canada, Jean Chrétien, predicted that  provincial revenues from Hibernia might be large 
enough to make Newfoundland a have province within five years of production.59  
This kind of rapid economic growth was not achieved.  As the offset provisions were 
winding down,60 Newfoundland and Nova Scotia pursued a new deal.  By 2004, revenue 
from the offshore industry totaled over $1 billion for both provinces together.  However, 
after the Equalization clawback Newfoundland retained only 12 percent and Nova Scotia 
kept 19 percent of the profits.61   The Atlantic Accords no longer provided effective 
shelter for offshore rents.  Premier Williams and Premier Hamm joined together to renew 
the Atlantic Accords 1985 and 1986.  
 
1.  Positions 
There are several reasons for the provinces to pursue a deal outside of the regular 
Equalization process.  The negotiation process took nearly a year to complete.  One of the 
main reasons for the drawn-out process was the rigid positions held by the Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia governments, as well as the federal government.  While the federal 
positions dealt with program feasibility, the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia position 
relied on the dilemma of nonrenewable natural resources and the clawback as explained 
in Chapter 2. 
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1.1    Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 
Throughout the negotiation process Newfoundland and Nova Scotia insisted on 
keeping 100 percent of the revenues accrued through offshore oil.  Their position was 
rooted in two propositions.  The first is that the commitments and intentions of the 1985 
and 1986 Atlantic Accords had not been fulfilled.  The second argument dealt with the 
general problems of the Equalization clawback on natural resources as discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
1.1.1 Atlantic Accord Unfulfilled 
The Atlantic Accords were signed in 1985 and 1986, in the midst of unrealistic 
expectations regarding the amount and timing of offshore development.  In spite of 
predictions that oil production would render Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have 
provinces within five years of production, in reality neither province generated huge 
revenues.  The Newfoundland and Labrador Royal Commission on Renewing and 
Strengthening Our Place in Canada reported that by the time the offset payments expired 
in 2011, Newfoundland would have received a mere fraction of the originally intended 
benefits unless both parties to the bilateral Atlantic Accord make the necessary 
adjustments to reflect the changes in the actual evolution of the offshore industry as 
compared to their earlier analyses and assumptions.62  For Nova Scotia, the offset 
payment period was due to expire in 2004-05. Neither province's offshore industry 
realized the expectations of the mid 1980s. Moreover, the offset mechanism was 
triggered by smaller projects that did not generate anticipated revenue.  Initial 
assessments of the offshore oil fields predicted that once production of oil commenced, 
the fields would be developed quickly.  However, during the first years of production, the 
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fields were developed more slowly than anticipated.  By the expiration of the offset 
provisions, neither province had generated the large offshore revenues that were 
predicted.63  Therefore, by 2004, the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords had not produced 
the intended effects. 
The Atlantic Accords were created in the spirit of sharing all offshore revenue 
until each province attained have status.64  Indeed, the 1982 Canada-Newfoundland and 
Canada-Nova Scotia agreements that were the precursors of the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic 
Accords contained numerous statements that suggest that Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 
were to be the long-term beneficiaries of their offshore industries.65  For example, 
Section 15 of the 1982 Nova Scotia Agreement says, the intention is that resource 
revenues from the offshore region shall be reduced only gradually to ensure that Nova 
Scotias fiscal and economic benefits are lasting.66   This statement implies that the 
offset mechanism should function to ensure that Nova Scotia retains its energy revenues 
during the most productive years of the oil field.  The 1982 Newfoundland Agreement 
states that it is recognized that Newfoundland should enjoy the major share of the 
revenue that offshore resources are expected to generate.67  Furthermore, both the 1985 
and 1986 Atlantic Accords include a statement of purposes.  One of the purposes is "to 
recognize the right of [the provinces] to be the principal beneficiary of the oil and gas 
resources off [their] shores, consistent with the requirement for a strong and united 
Canada."68   
The Atlantic Accords failed to fulfill their most fundamental purposes.  As 
explained earlier, the original intention was to guarantee that Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia could reap the benefits of their offshore industries.  In order for the provinces to 
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collect the offshore rents, the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords needed to be amended.  
The provincial position demanded that Newfoundland and Nova Scotia remain the 
principal beneficiaries of offshore rents until such time as they meet or exceed a national 
average economic and fiscal capacity.69 
1.1.2 Allowing Economic Development 
The second component of Newfoundland and Nova Scotias position relies on the 
arguments against clawing back nonrenewable natural resources, as discussed in Chapter 
2.  Williams and Hamm use provincial ownership arguments and Boessenkools 
nonrenewable resources-as-assets reasoning.  However, the Newfoundland-Nova Scotia 
positions are sui generis.  These provinces have been among the most impoverished 
regions of Canada since Confederation.  The promise of an oil and petroleum industry 
offered the hope of long-overdue economic prosperity. 
Williams and Hamm pointed out that when Albertas oil industry was in its 
infancy, natural resources were not fully included in the formula.  Therefore, that 
province could help its industry reach maturity before it had to deal with the clawback.70  
For Premier Williams, the offshore issue is about more than squeezing more money out 
of Ottawa:  It is about the province of Newfoundland and Labrador finally achieving our 
true potential. We are asking only for our provincial share. We are asking only for a 
chance. A chance we deserve.71    Newfoundland and Nova Scotia wanted the one-time 
opportunity to convert offshore oil reserves into a thriving economy. 
1.2     The Federal Government 
From the beginning of the negotiation process in early 2004 to the signing of the 
deals, in February 2005 the federal position remained the same: Newfoundland and Nova 
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Scotia deserved special treatment due to their extreme indebtedness and economic 
disparity.72    In fact, the final deal included a substantial initial payment with the 
intended purpose (but not a legislated requirement) of paying down the provincial 
debts.73 The only conflict between the federal position and the position of Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia involved the extent of the special treatment.  Martin sought conditions 
and ceilings that would contain the cost of the new Accords.  The federal government 
wanted to put a cap on the clawback exemption.  Specifically, the federal proposal set the 
ceiling at the fiscal capacity of Ontario. 74  The federal government also fought for a 
clause that conditioned the offset payments on balanced provincial budgets.75  In the end, 
the federal government abandoned the Ontario ceiling76 and the balanced budget clause.77 
 
2. Process 
2.1     Closed Door Negotiations 
Between 2001 and 2004, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland made several attempts 
to reopen the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords.  Nova Scotias four year Campaign for 
Fairness included public awareness campaigns, press releases, articles, and a public 
signature campaign all designed to pressure the federal government into action.78  
Newfoundlands 2003 Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in 
Canada highlighted the inadequacy of the original Accords and recommended a new deal 
for the provinces.79   However, both provincial efforts failed to capture the attention of 
the federal government.     
The first sign that the Liberal government in Ottawa was ready to reopen the 
offshore issue came on February 23, 2004 when the federal Minister of Natural 
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Resources, John Efford, confirmed that Paul Martin had asked him to look into the 
possibilities for reforming the Atlantic Accords.  Efford announced that he would meet 
with fellow Newfoundlander Danny Williams to discuss all the options.80  This would be 
the first of many meetings held between Williams and federal officials.  Nova Scotias 
Premier Hamm also participated in talks with the federal government. However, during 
the first phase Williams dominated the process.81 
The first sign of concrete progress came on June 5, 2004 when Williams reported 
that he and Martin had reached a verbal offshore oil agreement during a telephone 
conversation. 82  Hamm and Martin reached a similar verbal deal.83  The exact terms of 
agreements were the subject of much contention in the future months.  Hamm and 
Williams insisted that Martin promised to provide total reimbursements for all 
Equalization clawbacks on offshore oilwithout qualification.  Martin would later 
announce that the deals were always subject to certain limitations and ceilings. Williams 
wrote a letter confirming Newfoundlands understanding of the deal on June 10.  No 
further contact was made between the provinces and the federal government until after 
the June 28 federal election.   
By August, Williams grew anxious to move the deal forward.  He wrote two 
letters to the Prime Minister confirming Newfoundlands support for the deal.  Neither 
letter prompted a response from Ottawa.  Williams maintained that the lack of response 
implied a confirmation that Martin had no objections to the agreement as specified in 
Williams letters.84 
Between August and October, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia unsuccessfully 
attempted to push forward their version of the agreements.  Both provincial governments 
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issued news releases and spoke publicly about their desire to finalize the agreements.  
The first formal response from Ottawa came in a letter from federal Finance Minister 
Ralph Goodale on October 24.  In his letter, Goodale confirmed the existence of a deal, 
but added qualifications.  The letter stated that the annual payments made to 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia will be subject to the provision that no such additional 
payment result in the fiscal capacity of the province(s) exceeding that of the province of 
Ontario in any given year.85  Goodale suggestedcontrary to the Newfoundland-Nova 
Scotia position that the Ontario clause had always been part of the discussions between 
Ottawa and the provinces.86   
Williams responded with hostility to Goodales letter.  He accused the federal 
government of violating the June 5 agreement. After Williams placed a phone call to the 
Prime Minster that was not returned,87 both Williams and Hamm rejected the terms set 
out in Goodales letter. 88  The rejection occasioned the beginning of the second phase of 
negotiation. 
2.2      Public Pressure 
The second phase of the negotiation process included antagonistic exchanges 
between the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Premiers and the federal government.  
Person-to-person negotiations ceased and the battle for public sympathies began.  The 
inflexible positions of the provinces and the federal government prevented productive 
mediation.  In an interview with the CBC, a reporter asked if there was any flexibility in 
Newfoundlands position. Williams responded unequivocally: No, from my perspective, 
a deal is a deal.  I mean if he [the Prime Minister] reached an agreement with me, he 
 40 
 
clearly understood what it was, the wording was very simple  100% of the revenues.  It 
couldnt be any tighter or any simpler.89 
 On October 26, Williams boycotted the First Ministers Meeting on Equalization.  
Hamm publicly supported Williams position, but decided to attend the meeting 
himself.90  Newfoundlands absence from the meeting incited harsh words from Scott 
Reid, the Prime Ministers Director of Communications.  Reid rebuked Williams for not 
attending the meeting, suggesting that such cheap political ploys would hurt 
Newfoundland in the long run.  While Reid later issued a public apology, it did little to 
quell Williams anger.91  Williams announced that he would no longer participate in 
negotiations if Reid were involved.  Martin refused to betray his communications officer, 
thus talks remained at a standstill.92 
In every speaking engagement, presentation, media conference, and news release, 
Williams and Hamm repeated their message: the Prime Minister had broken his end of 
the deal at the expense of the people of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  The provinces 
message was constant, and it was repeated over and over again.  Eventually, evidence 
surfaced that the public campaign was resonating on Parliament Hill.  On November 15, 
two federal Liberal MPs from Newfoundland, Scott Simms and Bill Matthews, broke 
ranks and voted for an Opposition motion on the Atlantic Accords.93          
2.3      Back to the Table 
In early December, negotiations restarted.  However, the provinces were not 
congenial participants.  Williams and Hamm held out for their deal sans limitations or 
conditions.  On December 7, Williams and his Minister of Finance flew to Ottawa to 
force an unscheduled meeting with Goodale.94  This process was repeated several times 
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during December, each time involving more fanfare and public spectacle.  Stories of 
Newfoundlanders weathering cold winter blizzards to cheer the Premier as he went off to 
Ottawa to fight for a deal filled the provincial media. 95  On December 23, Williams and 
Martin met in Winnipeg.  Williams announced that he would not leave without a deal for 
Newfoundland.96  When the meeting ended without agreement, Williams made a move 
that stirred controversy across the country. 
2.4       The Flag Flap 
Following the Winnipeg meeting, Williams announced that the negotiations were 
over.  He explained that the federal government would not give Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia a deal without conditions, therefore Newfoundland had indefinitely left the 
bargaining table.97  Williams ordered the Canadian flag to be removed from most 
provincial government buildings.  He announced that the flags would not be returned 
until Newfoundland got a deal.98  The flag stunt achieved mixed results.  Support for 
Newfoundland waned throughout the rest of the country.  Premier Hamm disassociated 
his province from the move. 99  Williams decided to soften his position.  He assured 
Canadians that the Canadian flags would eventually go up again with or without a deal 
because our problem is not with the people of the country.  Its with the Prime Minister, 
its with the leader of the country.100   
In Newfoundland, whatever support Williams may have lost with the flag stunt 
was won back by Margaret Wentes January 6 column in the Globe and Mail.  Wente 
accused Newfoundland of mooching off the hard work of the rest of the country.  She 
also personally attacked the Premier: Mr. Williams reminds me of a deadbeat brother-in 
law whos hit you up for money a few times too often. Hes been sleeping on the couch 
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for years, and how hes got the nerve to complain that its too lumpy.101  The article 
calls Newfoundland a welfare ghetto. 102 
Williams was the first to respond to Wentes column.  In a letter to the newspaper 
and a press release, the Premier stirred provincial nationalist sentiments.  He defended 
Newfoundlands character and integrity.  He suggested that the prevalence of these kinds 
of prejudices was precisely the reason why Newfoundlands government had lowered 
Canadian flags.103  The Prime Minister also publicly expressed his disagreement with 
Wentes article.104  Edward Greenspon, editor of the Globe and Mail, said that the reader 
response triggered by the column set records.  On the first day alone, the newspaper 
received over 900 emails. 105    The people of Newfoundland banded together.  Even a 
swimsuit maker discontinued the line of bathing suits that featured the Canadian flag. 106   
2.5        Making a Deal  
On January 10, Williams remounted the flags.107  The last phase of negotiation 
involved a return to closed-door talks.  Williams publicly requested a meeting with the 
Prime Minister in order to clear the air.108  Williams ordered all his Cabinet Ministers 
to clear their schedules and stand by to discuss a potential deal.109  On January 27, 
Williams, Hamm and Martin met in Ottawa.  After 10 hours of deliberations, the three 
emerged with a signed agreement on offshore oil revenues.110  Williams professed that he 
was very, very proud to be Canadian.111   
The final deals give an estimated $830 million in offset payments to Nova Scotia and 
$2.6 billion to Newfoundland over an eight-year period.  The offset payments are equal 
to 100 percent of any reductions in Equalization payments [the clawback] from offshore 
resources revenues.112   If by 2012 the provinces remain Equalization recipients and 
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their per-capita debt servicing charges are not lower than four provinces, the offshore 
agreements will be extended to 2019-2020.  If, at any time, Newfoundland or Nova 
Scotia no longer qualify for Equalization, the offset payments will be phased out so as to 
guarantee that each years payment will be no less than two thirds of the previous years 
payment. 113   
2.6   An Exceptional Process 
The renewed Atlantic Accords received national attention, not only for their content, 
but also for the process by which they were negotiated.  The Equalization formula is 
renewed every five years.  Changes to the Program and the formula are a product of five 
years of formal and informal collaboration between the federal government and the 
provincesthough the federal government always makes the final decision. Equalization 
was renewed in 2004.   However, the offshore deals were agreed to completely outside of 
this renewal process.  Unlike the conventional practice, the deals were a result of bilateral 
and trilateral talks.  At no point did the other provinces participate.   
While the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords did set a precedent for this kind of 
exceptional treatment, the 2005 round provoked much more national attention.  A 
possible reason for the different public perception of the two processes may be the scope 
of the two agreements.  The 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords were negotiated to solve 
issues of jurisdiction and administration.  The Accords set down guidelines for a joint 
federal-provincial regulatory body and rent-sharing provisions.  While the agreements did 
deal with Equalization, the rest of the country perceived them as a jurisdictional and 
administrative arrangement more than an Equalization one-off. 
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The 2004-2005 campaign dealt specifically with the Equalization component of the 
Atlantic Accords.  This singular focus made the irregular process more apparent to the 
rest of the country.  Furthermore, Williams tactics were highly visible to all Canadians.  
The 2004 offshore deals mark a significant departure from the conventional process.  
Instead of competing with other governments demands inside the five-year cycle, 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia circumvented the process and secured bilateral deals 
with Ottawa. 
 
3. Political Motivations 
Outside factors weighed in the decision-making processes both on the provincial the 
federal sides.  The political factors included two minority governments, a strong majority 
government, and an election.   
3.1 Newfoundland 
The election of Danny Williams Conservatives in October 2003 was the turning 
point in the quest for a new Equalization deal.  Williams led his party to an 
overwhelming majority, sweeping the legislature with 34 of the 48 seats and turfing out 
the Liberals who had governed Newfoundland since 1989.114     
For Williams, there was little in the way of a downside to fighting a no holds barred 
campaign for a new Accord.  Newfoundlanders had already rewarded his controversial 
antics in the 2004 election.  Upon entering government, Williams Conservatives 
immediately began the implementation of a tough debt-reduction strategy.  Some of 
Williams cost-cutting measures were unpopular with Newfoundlanders. With Williams 
personal popularity falling to an all time low of 39% in Spring 2004, 115 the offshore issue 
offered an attractive strategy to boost his personal popularity. 
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Williams successfully positioned himself as the champion of underdog 
Newfoundland.116  Because of his highly publicized actions such as his commitment to 
donating his Premiers salary to charity, Williams was able to portray a selfless Premier 
who had put his personal ambitions aside to fight the good fight for his province.  As 
his campaign for a new deal gained publicity and momentum, Williams popularity 
steadily climbed in polls.  A Corporate Research Associates survey conducted between 
February 10 and March 4, 2005 found that 86 percent of Newfoundlanders were mostly 
or completely satisfied with Williams performance. 117       
The only point during the process at which Williams popularity was threatened was 
during the 17-day removal of the Canadian flag.  However, whatever support the stunt 
cost the Premier was promptly regained following the Margaret Wentes January 6 Globe 
and Mail column.  The column stirred nationalist sentiment in Newfoundland upon which 
Williams was able to capitalize.   
While political factors were probably not the only motivation behind Williams 
flamboyant campaign, the political reality cannot be discounted.  Newfoundlands 
premier was not constrained by the limitations of a minority government.  Therefore he 
was free to use his personality, leadership style, and majority, to fight a showy battle 
against the federal government.  As a Halifax newspaper columnist pointed out: No 
provincial premier has ever lost votes by beating up on Ottawa.118  With the new 
offshore agreement, Williams cemented a long-lasting legacy for himself in 
Newfoundland. 
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3.2 Nova Scotia 
The political circumstances were very different in Nova Scotia. The two most 
important political factors were the minority government and the amount of oil involved. 
The 2001 provincial election returned a minority government to the provincial legislature.  
Premier Hamms Progressive Conservatives were forced to find common ground with the 
provincial NDP and Liberals who came in second and third respectively.119  The offshore 
oil issue was a cause under which all parties could unite. In order to advance Nova 
Scotias offshore position, John Hamm continued his Campaign for Fairness with a new 
partner: Danny Williams.  
 The minority government situation and Hamms personal leadership style 
constrained the tactics available to the Premier.  During the flag escapade, Hamm was 
careful to distance Nova Scotia from the controversy.  He publicly sympathized with 
Williams position, but continued alone in Nova Scotias negotiations with Ottawa.120  
Throughout the campaign, Hamm was the more subdued of the two Premiers.  While 
Williams routinely lambasted the federal government, Hamm kept his public discourse 
more cordial. 121  Hamm never walked out of any important meetings, he did not fly to 
Ottawa demanding impromptu meetings, and he did not take down the maple leaf.  In a 
minority government, such antics would have left Hamm susceptible to opposition 
criticism.  
A second possible political factor that influenced Hamms negotiation style was the 
smaller size of Nova Scotias offshore reserves.  As Williams pointed out, Nova Scotia 
had less to gain in the final deal because it has fewer chips in the future pot. 122  
Because Nova Scotia did not have as much offshore oil, highly inflammatory actions 
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would have been more difficult to justify.  As a result, the Nova Scotia negotiations 
proved considerably less tumultuous than the Newfoundland campaign.  Hamm was able 
to conduct a civilized campaign, and join Williams at the signing table.   
3.3 Federal Government 
Paul Martin had significant political motivation to reach an agreement that was 
satisfactory for all three parties.  The Sponsorship Scandal had provided Stephen 
Harpers Conservatives with plenty of ammunition against the Liberal government.  For 
the first time in over a decade, the Liberal grip on Ottawa was insecure. 
During the close 2004 federal election campaign, the seat configuration could not 
have been far from Martins considerations.  Newfoundland and Nova Scotia held five 
swing ridings that could have proved crucial in a close election.  Newfoundland had three 
swing seats: Bonavista-Exploits, St. Johns North, and St. Johns South.123  Nova Scotia 
also had three very tight races: Halifax, West Nova, and South Shore-St. Margarets.124  
The June 5 telephone call in which Williams alleges Martin promised a renewed Accord 
sans conditions occurred right in the midst of the election campaign. The Halifax Daily 
News accuses Martin of welshing: The strategy was simple: promise anything and deal 
with the fallout after victory and power were assured.125  This statement probably 
exaggerates Martins intentions; however, it is reasonable to assume that the timing of the 
promise and its election implications did affect Martins considerations. 
On June 28, a Liberal minority returned to Parliament.  Martin faced the added 
pressures of an unstable minority government.  The negotiation process promised to 
inflame similar Equalization grievances in Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and the North 
West Territories.126  Furthermore, the process threatened to renew Ontario and Quebec 
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objections to the alleged fiscal imbalance.127  All of these issues would be difficult to 
confront in a minority government.  These considerations may have led to the 
unwillingness of the federal government to pursue negotiations quickly. 128   They also 
may have inspired the federal government to insist on terms and conditions on the 
original June 5 oral agreement. 
In the final stages of negotiations, the drawn-out battle was proving divisive to the 
country and the government.  The federal Liberals were under considerable stress, as 
demonstrated by the two MPs breaking ranks on November 15, 2004 on the offshore 
issue.  Williams campaign demanded the attention of the entire country.  By January 
2005, the federal government was eager to see an end to the dispute.  Indeed, in the final 
agreements, the federal government dropped the two main sources of contention: the 
Ontario ceiling and the balanced budget clause. 
 
4. What about the rest? 
The signing of the new Offshore Accords has implications for every province and 
territory. By sheltering offshore revenues from the clawback, the Accords of 1985, 1986, 
and 2005 have set a precedent from which the rest of the provinces may launch their own 
challenges.  North West Territories Premier Joe Handly reasons that the economic 
challenges facing his people surpass those of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  Therefore, 
Handly reasons that his Territory should keep the $200 million clawed back each year 
resulting from the production of diamonds.129  Premier Bernard Lord of New Brunswick 
also announced that he would be seeking offset payments for his provinces natural 
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resource clawbacks.130  Saskatchewan has joined the North West Territories and New 
Brunswick in seeking similar terms.  Chapter 4 will examine the case of Saskatchewan. 
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Chapter 4:  The Saskatchewan Case 
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The signing of the Offshore Accords in February 2005 added legitimacy to 
Saskatchewans grievances with the Equalization Program.  Saskatchewans case is 
rooted in the 1982 Equalization renewal.  The 1982 Equalization package was a product 
of a series of problematic conditions in the 1970s.  International market prices for natural 
resources increased significantly.  Resource-endowed provinces saw substantial growth 
in revenues, which increased fiscal disparities among provinces.  In an effort to prevent 
Equalization costs from soaring, Ottawa amended the Equalization Program.  The 
changes included a limitation on natural resource rents entering the formula.  Only one-
third of resource revenue was subject to Equalization.  In addition, only one-third of the 
entire Equalization costs could come from natural resources.   
After 1977, further amendments required 50 percent of natural resource revenue to 
enter the formula.131  As a consequence of the 1977 Equalization changes, Ontario 
became a have-not province.  The prospect of Ontario receiving Equalization transfers 
was politically and financially unacceptable.   The challenge facing policymakers was to 
find a way to legitimately exclude Ontario from receiving payments.  The most 
substantial change in 1977 was the introduction of an income ceiling. The ceiling 
provided that no province would be eligible for Equalization if its per capita personal 
income was higher than the national average.  This provision only affected Ontario.  
However, Ontario accepted the amendments based on a condition that the 1982 
amendments would comprehensively address the problems in the Equalization 
Program.132  Leading up to the 1982 Program renewal, Equalization was on the brink of 
crisis.  Governments recognized the need for a fundamental overhaul. 
 52 
 
Several provinces devised proposals for a remodeled system of Equalization.                                             
Saskatchewans proposalcoined NAS-20 was released in 1981. The proposal called 
for a 10-province national standard.  However, only 20 percent of natural resources 
revenues would be included in the formula.133  Had NAS-20 been implemented, it would 
have eliminated Saskatchewans future issues with Equalization.  The NAS-20 proposal 
minimized the weight of resource revenueswhich are at the root of Saskatchewans 
present Equalization issues.  Because Saskatchewan is the only major oil and natural gas 
producer in the five province standard, these revenues are clawed back at confiscatory 
rates.  Under the NAS-20 proposal the clawback on energy revenues would be reduced.  
However, the Saskatchewan proposal was not adopted.134  
The 1982 amendments fundamentally altered the formula.  First, the ten province 
standard was replaced by the five province standard (FPS). The new formula excluded 
the oil revenues from Alberta, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia, as these provinces were 
no longer part of the standard.  Second, 100 percent of nonrenewable natural resources 
entered the formula.  Together, these changes positioned Saskatchewans natural 
resources for a disproportionate clawback.  Saskatchewan is now the only province in the 
FPS that receives significant revenues from oil and natural gas.  As a consequence, the 
provinces oil rents are disproportionately penalized by the clawback.  Furthermore, the 
full inclusion of nonrenewable natural resources guarantees that Saskatchewans oil rents 
are subjected to clawback rates near to or exceeding 100 percent.  This phenomenon will 
be further examined in the rest of the chapter. 
In spite of the long-term negative implications for Saskatchewan, the province paid 
little public attention to these issues after 1982.135  Few provinces were sympathetic to 
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Saskatchewans position.  Discussions about Saskatchewans disadvantageous position in 
the Equalization Program remained largely out of the public sphere.  Awareness 
remained confined to the official and sometimes ministerial levels.136 
 
1.         Positions 
1.1   Saskatchewan 
Saskatchewan is actively calling for an immediate implementation of a Saskatchewan 
Energy accord modeled on the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Offshore Accords.  A 
second option the province has advocated is the complete removal of nonrenewable 
natural resources from the Equalization formula.137  However, the Province does not want 
to see the discontinuation of the modern Equalization Program.  Instead, Saskatchewan is 
calling for a comprehensive review of Equalization and an investigation into alternative 
ways of modeling the Program.138  Saskatchewan has five primary concerns about 
Equalization. 
1.1.1    Burden of the 5 province standard 
 The 1982 adoption of the FPS introduced a host of problems for Saskatchewan.  
In a ten province standard, every provinces revenues are treated equally.  However, 
when certain provinces were excluded from the standard, a discrepancy in the treatment 
between standard and non-standard provinces emerged.  In all provinces, an increase in 
revenues will lead to a loss in Equalization entitlements (clawback).  The clawback 
results from a calculation in which revenues are multiplied by the national average tax 
rate for the revenueregardless of the provinces own tax rate.  An increase in revenues 
in a province in the FPS will also raise the FPS.    The FPS penalizes Saskatchewan for 
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being the only significant oil and gas-producing province in the standard.  Because 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and, most importantly, Alberta are excluded in the FPS, 
Saskatchewan oil revenues almost exclusively determine the standard by which oil and 
gas revenues are equalized.  Therefore, by definition, Saskatchewans revenues accruing 
from New Oil, Old Oil, Heavy Oil, Third Tier Oil, Heavy Third Tier Oil, Natural Gas, 
Sale of Crown Leases, and Other Oil and Gas, will be clawed back at a nearly 
confiscatory (100 percent) rate.  Saskatchewan experiences extremely high annual 
clawbacks because the FPS overstates the importance of resources to the fiscal capacity 
of Saskatchewan, which is a direct result of the absence of Albertas wealth from the 
five-province standard. 139 
 The direct impact of the FPS  and the consequent exclusion of Albertas energy revenues 
is the penalization of all new oil and gas developments in that province.  Saskatchewan argues 
that this unique situation prevents the province from enjoying a reasonable proportion of the 
government revenue arising out of its oil and gas industry.  Premier Calvert notes: The formula 
seems almost designed to make provinces like Saskatchewan poorer in the federation, and that 
seems to me to be quite absurd.140   
1.1.2    Without a Generic Solution 
  The application of the Generic Solution also disadvantages Saskatchewan.  As 
explained in Chapter 2, the Generic Solution protects provinces that have more than a 70 
percent share of a national revenue source.  However, instead of using the five provinces 
of the FPS group to calculate eligibility for the Generic Solution, all provinces are 
included.  This discrepancy causes negative consequences for Saskatchewan.  
Saskatchewans has significantly more than 70 percent of the oil and natural gas revenues 
in the FPS.  However, Saskatchewan does not have more than 70 percent of the national 
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ten-province energy revenue bases.  Therefore, this provinces energy revenues do not 
qualify for the Generic Solution.  If the Generic Solution were instead calculated using 
the FPS to accurately reflect the true implications of the clawback, three of 
Saskatchewans oil revenue bases would qualify for protection (73.8 percent of new oil, 
94.2 percent of heavy oil, 97.4 percent of third-tier oil).141 Because of the FPS and 
Saskatchewans disqualification from the Generic Solution, the provinces nonrenewable 
resources, and energy revenues in particularly, are subjected to excessively high 
clawback rates.142 
1.1.3 The Confiscatory Clawback 
Confiscatory Clawback is a term coined by Professor Thomas J. Courchene.  It 
refers to case where the Equalization clawback confiscates a particular revenue source at 
a rate of 100 percent or more.  Courchene highlights particular instances in which some 
Saskatchewan revenue bases have been clawed back by more than 100 percent.  This 
phenomenon can be attributed to several factors.  The first involves the method of 
measurement.  Most natural resource revenues that enter the Equalization formula are not 
the actual amounts earned by a province.  Instead, the calculation is determined 
externally through aggregates and averaging.  Essentially, the Equalization calculation 
estimates what the province could have earned if it had set its tax rates at the appropriate 
level instead of what it actually earned.  This approach is necessary to eliminate perverse 
incentives to use royalty levels and taxation rates to maximize a provinces Equalization 
transfer.  A confiscatory situation can occur when the formula assumes that a province 
can efficiently tax at a level that is in fact inflated.  Courchene uses the example of 
Crown Lease Sales in Saskatchewan to demonstrate the phenomenon.   
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According to the Equalization calculation, for the fiscal year 2000-2001, 
Saskatchewan could tax the sale of Crown Leases at a rate of 15.6 percent.  However, 
Saskatchewans actual taxation rate was only 6.9 percent.  Therefore, the Equalization 
formula assumes that the Saskatchewan government is under-collecting revenues from 
this source by 8.9 percent.  There are several reasons why Saskatchewans taxation rate 
would be lower than the rate determined through the Equalization formula.  First, 
Saskatchewan could be deliberately setting its rate low in order to attract private 
investment to its oil and natural gas industry.  If this is the case, then it is reasonable for 
the province to endure the confiscatory clawback.  However, the low taxation rate may 
also be attributed to the true value of Saskatchewans leases.  In the Equalization formula, 
there is only one category for sale of crown leases.  Therefore, the formula implicitly 
assumes that all leases in every province will be worth an equal amount.  In reality, this is 
not the case.  Some leases are more valuable than others because the oil is easier to 
extract.  For example, an investor will be willing to pay more for a lease in Alberta that 
has the potential to reap greater returns than for a lease in Saskatchewan which may 
deliver less revenue.  Consequently, using external aggregates to determine the potential 
tax rate for sale of crown leases is not always an accurate or impartial method of 
calculating Equalization entitlements.  Due to these factors, in the fiscal year 2000-2001 
Saskatchewans revenue from sales of Crown leases was clawed back by 201.6 
percent.143   
1.1.4   Disincentive for Development: Saskatchewans Voiseys Bay 
 Apache Canada Ltd. is one of Saskatchewans largest oil and gas producers.  In 
2003, Apache brought a project proposal to the provincial government.  Apache wanted 
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to inject carbon dioxide into an oil field near Midale, thereby extending the life of the oil 
field by 20 to 25 years.  The company requested from the Province several fiscal 
incentives to make the project more financially manageable.  By the governments own 
estimates, Saskatchewan would receive approximately $105 million from the project.    
However, the project would result in a clawback of approximately $166 million.144 The 
discrepancy between the actual earned revenue and the Equalization clawback is partly 
due to the costs that the Saskatchewan government would incur in order to encourage and 
facilitate the project.  These costs include infrastructure investments, tax rebates, and 
other incentives.  This projected clawback rate was 150 percent over the life span of the 
project.  Premier Calvert describes his provinces dilemma:  Due to the high cost of this 
type of project, Saskatchewan was faced with a choice: provide the fiscal incentive, or 
not have the project succeed.145  The Province proceeded with the Apache proposal, 
including the fiscal incentives, in spite of the Equalization repercussions.  However, the 
clawback disincentives were a significant consideration.   
 Saskatchewan estimates that 30 billion barrels of heavy oil in the ground are not 
presently being recovered because of the high cost of the necessary technology.  The 
clawback limits the provinces capacity to support the development of such technology.  
This undeveloped oil effectively abandons a trillion dollars in the ground.146  The Premier 
emphasizes that  
these clawback rates are so excessive that they have become a serious 
consideration in our review of such projects.  At present, the equalization program 
is a disincentive for the development of projects in Saskatchewan that create 
jobs, enhance our national energy self-sufficiency. (sic)147 
 
The disincentives in the Equalization formula create a dilemma for the Saskatchewan 
Government.   It must choose to invest in development projects and technology that may 
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lead to a short-term decline in overall provincial revenues, or decline to invest and absorb 
the long-term economic consequences.  Revenues from oil and natural gas make up over 
$1 billion of the provincial budget.  In the 2006-2007 estimates, these revenues 
constituted over 15 percent of provincial income.148  The large proportion of oil and 
natural gas in the Saskatchewan budget creates significant Equalization disincentives in 
terms of government investment. 
1.1.5    The Offshore Dealsthe case for equity 
 The Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Offshore Accords fundamentally altered 
Saskatchewans position within the Equalization Program relative to the other provinces.  
With the federal governments decision to allow Newfoundland and Nova Scotia to 
shelter their offshore oil rents, Saskatchewan became the only province subjected to a 
confiscatory oil and natural gas clawback.  Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia are the primary oil and gas producers in the country.  The latter two have 
successfully sheltered these rents through the Offshore Accords.  Albertas fiscal capacity 
firmly entrenches the province in have status thereby rendering the clawback irrelevant.  
However, Saskatchewan is closer to the have not line.  The elimination or reduction of 
the energy clawback would result in the resumption of Equalization transfers to that 
province.  Therefore, Saskatchewan is now the only province that suffers a high clawback 
for its oil and gas revenues.   
 The Saskatchewan government is lobbying the federal government for a new 
energy Equalization arrangement on equity grounds.  Premier Calvert explains:  What 
we see of course is equity and fair treatment of the resource base of all provinces.  That 
principle, now established in Atlantic Canada, I think clearly now should apply across 
the nation.149  Calvert notes that the high cost of offshore oil and gas extraction is one of 
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the reasons that the Atlantic Accords were enacted.  If this is the case, then it is 
reasonable to argue that CO2 injection in Saskatchewans oil fields qualify for a similar 
accord due to the high costs of extracting the oil reservoirs.150  A similar case can be 
made for the high costs of extracting Saskatchewans heavy oil. 
 Since the implementation of the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords, which 
effectively allowed Newfoundland and Nova Scotia to protect 70 percent of their oil 
revenues from the clawback, Saskatchewans position highlighted the discrepancy in the 
Equalization Program.  Saskatchewan reasoned that the same protection should be 
extended to its energy revenues in accordance with principles of fairness and equity.151  
However, instead of remedying the inequitable treatment, the federal government 
extended even greater protection to offshore oil.  Under the February 2005 Offshore 
Accords, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia retain 100 percent of the revenues from their 
energy sector.  However, at best, Saskatchewan can only keep 10 percent of its oil and 
gas revenues.152  In fact, as demonstrated by Thomas Courchene, in some years 
Saskatchewan loses all of its energy revenues to the Equalization clawback.  
Saskatchewan is seeking an Energy Accord or Equalization reform that will allow energy 
revenues to remain in the province.153 
1.2  Ottawa  
     1.2.1   Prime Minister Martin 
Once the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Offshore Accords were signed in February 
2005, Ottawa intended to put the Equalization issue aside until the scheduled formula 
renewal in 2008.  However, the ink was not yet dry when Saskatchewan and other 
provinces demanded their own special Equalization provisions.  It stands to reason that if 
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Martin granted Saskatchewan an Energy Accord, then the entire Equalization Program 
would be up for negotiation.  Instead of opening the door to multiple side-deals, the 
federal government appointed a five-member expert panel to examine the Equalization 
Program and Territorial Financing scheme and make recommendations.  The Obrien 
panel allowed the federal government to demonstrate that the Equalization issue 
remained top priority without actually making immediate changes.  Finance Minister 
Goodale noted that at any given time the Equalization Program consists of over 1,320 
moving parts. 154  Before any additional changes or "one-offs" were made, the federal 
government argued that it needed the advice of the Expert Panel on Equalization and 
Territorial Formula Financing.  
Martin and Goodale emphasized that Saskatchewan does not share the same 
circumstances as Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  They argue that fairness does not 
necessarily mean uniformity.  Goodale states that  
In a country as big and diverse and complicated as Canada, fairness is not a 
simple matter of one-size fits all.  The various provinces and territories 
unfortunately do not share the same geography, the same history, the same 
population bases, the same physical resources, both renewable and nonrenewable, 
or the same level of economic development or future potential.  A cookie cutter 
approach from province to province or from region to region has never worked in 
Canada and likely never will.155 
 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia are unique in respect to their debt loads.  While 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotias debt to GDP ratio are 63 percent and 43 percent 
respectively, Saskatchewan is in line with the average for all provinces at around 25 
percent. 156  By 2005, Saskatchewan had achieved have" province status.  The provincial 
government delivered a "good news" budget and forecasted more surpluses in the future.  
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This was not the portrait of a province in dire fiscal need.  Therefore, Martin was not 
willing to negotiate an immediate Energy Accord. 
    1.2.2    Prime Minister Harper    
   Prime Minister Harper came to power with a different perspective than that of his 
Liberal predecessors.  The Conservative Partys election platforms in 2004 and in 2006 
promised to remove nonrenewable natural resources from the Equalization formula.157  
Harper continues to promise that his government will honour its election commitments.  
Equalization reform and the correction of the fiscal imbalance are part of Harpers vision 
of the new Open Federalism.158  If the federal government indeed does fulfill its 
commitments, Saskatchewans future grievances will be eliminated without the 
negotiation of a separate Energy Accord.     
 However, during the first session of the new Parliament, the Harper government 
did not move forward on its Equalization commitments.  In fact, the Conservatives seem 
to be back stepping on their previous commitments.  In June 2006, Federal Finance 
Minister Jim Flaherty sated that The government of Canada has not taken a position on 
(how to fix equalization) and that continues to be our position now  that we havent 
taken one.159  Moreover, Flaherty warns Saskatchewan that a bilateral energy accord is 
not in the cards: Agreeing as we all did on principle-based approach to equalization is 
very important because of the  lack of principle-based approach to equalization 
previous.160  The Finance Minister was referring to the Offshore Accords.   
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2. Process 
2.1     Inconspicuous Negotiations 
  In November 2005, the Saskatchewan Government released a report that detailed 
all of its efforts to date to secure a new Equalization arrangement.  The news release 
asserts that throughout the 1990s, the provincial government made continuous efforts to 
have rolled back the 1982 Equalization amendments specifically, the removal of 
Alberta from the standard.161  However, while Saskatchewan maintained a consistent 
position (a return to a  ten-province standard with less then 100 percent inclusion of 
natural resources) it found few allies among other provinces.   Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia were negotiating separately from Saskatchewan for greater control and retention of 
offshore oil revenue.   Albertas strong economy and revenue-earning capacity 
entrenched the province firmly in have status.162  While Alberta supported 
Saskatchewans position in principle, it had little interest in participating in a political 
battle with Ottawa.163   Saskatchewans Equalization grievances received little public 
attention; therefore, the province chose to focus its attention on more popular aspects of 
Equalization reform.164 
As Saskatchewans energy revenues grew, the provinces Equalization troubles 
increased.  Due to the inaccurate calculation of several energy-related revenue bases, 
Saskatchewans fiscal capacity was being grossly overestimated.  Moreover, the problem 
of being the only member of the FPS with growing oil and gas revenues guaranteed 
nearly confiscatory clawbacks.  As a consequence, Saskatchewans energy revenues were 
being clawed back in excess of 100 percent.  However, with little support, 
Saskatchewans Equalization grievances remained confined to discussions and analyses 
 63 
 
by public servants.  The issue never became the subject of inter-provincial negotiations or 
public campaigns.165 
2.2     The Revelation 
Phase two of Saskatchewans negotiations was initiated from outside government.  
Early in 2004, Thomas J. Courchene consulted with the Saskatchewan Government about 
a paper he was writing.  The piece: Confiscatory Equalization: The Intriguing Case of 
Saskatchewans Vanishing Energy Revenues, presented calculations that clearly 
demonstrated a clawback in excess of 100 percent of the provinces energy revenues.  
Courchenes article acted as a catalyst for Saskatchewans negotiations.  The piece was 
published by the Institute for Research on Public Policy.  Courchene also had an article 
published in the Globe and Mail.166  The detail in the paper gave Saskatchewan the 
substance it needed to instigate meaningful dialogue with Ottawa.  Courchene consulted 
with the Saskatchewan Government in early 2004 and his work was published in March 
2004.  During phase two of negotiations, Premier Calvert and Finance Minister Harry 
Van Mulligen met directly with their federal counterparts to secure compensation for the 
excessive clawbacks.   
In February 2004, for the first time, the Saskatchewan government explained the 
confiscatory clawback to the public.  In a February news release, the Government noted 
that [a]chieving higher resource royalties can result in a loss in Equalization payment of 
over 100 percent. Our province will have to continue to push the federal government 
for meaningful reform to the Equalization program.167  The provinces public objections 
to the excessive clawback on its energy revenues yielded a prompt response from the 
federal government.  On March 19, 2004, federal Finance Minister Ralph Goodale, 
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offered Saskatchewan a one-time payment of $120 million to offset the clawbacks that 
exceeded 100 percent of the revenues in the Crown Lease category.168 
Saskatchewan responded by increasing its demands on the federal government.  
The province petitioned Ottawa for compensation for its mining revenue categories 
which were being incorrectly penalized $40 to $50 million each year under the current 
mining tax base,169 (the mining clawback was also highlighted in Courchenes paper).  
Saskatchewan emphasized that a long-term solution needed to be negotiated.  In 
particular, Van Mulligen stated [w]e want the same deal as the Maritime Provinces.170 
Van Mulligen was referring to the 1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords which provided offset 
payments for energy revenue clawbacks.  Newfoundland and Nova Scotia also benefited 
from the Generic Solution.171 
On March 24, 2004, only a week after Ottawa announced the $120 compensation 
payment, Van Mulligen unveiled a $75,000 Equalization ad campaign designed to inform 
and mobilize Saskatchewan residents.  The ad ran in provincial newspapers for two 
weeks, highlighting the unfair treatment of Saskatchewan energy and mining revenues.  
The ads did little to unite partisan factions in Saskatchewan.  Saskatchewan Party Leader, 
Brad Wall, criticized the government for spending taxpayers' money on the campaign so 
soon after the dialogue had been opened with Ottawa.  While the Saskatchewan Party 
expressed supports for the provinces position on Equalization, Wall suggested that the 
Governments efforts were misplaced.  Calvert should try lobbying the Prime Minister 
and the Finance Minister, not provincial residents.172   
The ads also failed to rally Saskatchewanians behind the Equalization cause.  In fact, 
columnist Murray Mandryk suggests that this NDP campaign seems more suspicious 
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than sincere.  The media pointed out that the Equalization issues predated Courchenes 
paper.  Furthermore, if Saskatchewan has legitimate cause to seek a deal similar to the 
1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords, then why hasnt it [the Saskatchewan Government] 
negotiated a deal in the past 12 years?173  The Calvert Government faced media 
speculation that the ad campaign was merely an attempt to distract Saskatchewanians 
from the bad news budget that was due to be announced that week.174    
The federal response to Saskatchewans Equalization campaign was negative.  
Goodale called the ads juvenile.175  He also pointed out that Ottawas response had 
been prompt and generous:  
When do they [the Saskatchewan Government] remember a federal finance 
minister who delivered a cheque for $120 million cash on the dash to the 
government of Saskatchewan, within three or four weeks of that government 
raising a problem?  When have they before seen performance like that?176 
 
Martin made no public response to the Saskatchewan ads. 
  2.3      Stalemate 
On April 16, 2004 Premier Calvert traveled to Ottawa, hoping to promote 
Saskatchewans case to Martin.  Calverts Equalization agenda was endorsed by a 
unanimous resolution passed by the Saskatchewan legislature.177   Unfortunately, the 
Premier did not have the full attention of the Prime Minister.  Calverts visit was part of 
the federal governments announcement of a new health care package.  According to the 
Prime Ministers Office, Martin wanted to discuss BSE and Aboriginal issues.178  As a 
consequence, Saskatchewans Equalization problems were not a top priority for Martin or 
for the general public.179  After the meeting, Calvert reported that no new Equalization 
agreement had been reached between Saskatchewan and Ottawa, but I was encouraged 
by the time were able to spend together."180  According to the Premier, Martin promised 
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to have the federal Finance Minister look into the claim that Saskatchewan continued to 
suffer energy clawback rates in excess of 100 percent.181 
In the aftermath of Calverts meeting with the Prime Minister, Ottawa made no 
indication that a deal was in the cards for Saskatchewan.  Goodale emphasized that the 
federal government was not eager to reopen the Equalization Program which been 
renewed only a few months earlier.  As for extra-formula arrangements, Goodale noted 
that he was not willing to fix Saskatchewans problems in a sort of one-off situation on 
the back of an envelope.182  Neither Martin nor Goodale appeared ready to seriously 
consider Saskatchewans Equalization concerns.  The April 16th meeting was the last one-
on-one encounter with the Prime Minister or the Finance Minster until after the federal 
election in June.   
On April 28, 2004, Saskatchewans Finance Minister Harry Van Mulligen 
presented the provinces Equalization case to the Standing Senate Committee on National 
Finance.183  Calvert noted that Senate testimony is not as effective as direct negotiation, 
but that any effort to rouse public debate would benefit Saskatchewans cause.184 
 On May 28, Van Mulligen wrote a letter to Goodale, reiterating Saskatchewans 
position and requesting an Energy Accord.  On June 8, Van Mulligen wrote another letter 
to Louis Levesque, the federal Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance.  In the same month, 
Calvert sent a letter to all three federal parties requesting that the leaders publicly state 
their positions regarding the Equalization Program in light of the ongoing election 
campaign.185  While the Conservatives and the NDP promised drastic change including 
returning to a 10-province standard (Conservatives and NDP) and completely eliminating 
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nonrenewable natural resources from the formula (Conservatives), the Liberals made no 
concrete proposals.186 
 2.4  The Final Concession   
 In September 2004, after the election, Goodale promised Saskatchewan an 
additional $340 million for the excessive energy clawback.187  The federal action seemed 
to indicate good faith heading into the October 26 First Ministers Meeting in Regina.  
Calvert emerged from the First Ministers Meeting with $367 million - $27 million more 
than the province originally expected.188  The meeting also resulted in a $10 billion dollar 
infusion of federal cash into the existing Equalization Program.  Danny Williams 
dramatic exit overshadowed any impact Calverts case may have made at the meeting.189   
The meeting marked the last window of opportunity for Saskatchewan to make its case 
until after the Offshore Accords were signed in February 2005.  While Saskatchewan 
viewed the $367 million payment as a small step towards a larger Equalization 
arrangement, the federal government viewed it as the unofficial closing of negotiations.  
Between October 2004 and January 2005, the Saskatchewan government had little 
communication with Ottawa regarding Equalization.  
 2.5    The Offshore Accords 
 The signing of the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia Offshore Accords in February 
2005 bolstered Saskatchewans position.  Two days after the agreements were penned, 
Saskatchewan served notice that it would be formally pursuing its own bilateral 
arrangement.190   Previously, Calvert had been seeking an arrangement similar to the 
Atlantic Accords of the 1980s, i.e., offset payments to protect a portion of the clawback 
on energy revenues.  However, once the new Accords were finalized, Calvert expanded 
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Saskatchewans demands to reflect the provisions in the February Offshore Accords, i.e., 
protection for 100 percent of energy revenues.191 
 During this phase of negotiations Calvert gained an unexpected ally in the 
Conservative Party of Canada.  Several Saskatchewan MPs, including Brian Fitzpatrick, 
Lynn Yelich, and Tom Likuiski, became very vocal proponents of the Saskatchewan 
position.192  The Conservative support culminated in a vote in the House of Commons on 
legislation that would have allowed Saskatchewan to retain all profits from the energy 
sector.  The bill was defeated by the Bloc Quebecois and the Liberals.193 
 In spite of a February 2005 meeting between Calvert and Martin, Saskatchewan 
appeared to be no closer to an Equalization Accord.   The Premier built a unified 
coalition of partisan support for the Equalization battle, including Saskatchewan Party 
leader Brad Wall and Liberal Party leader David Karwaki.194  He also met with the 
editorial boards of the Globe and Mail and Macleans magazine.  In addition, Calvert 
presented Saskatchewans case at a luncheon speech at the Empire Club of Canada in 
Toronto.195   
 Between March and May 2005, the Premier had several opportunities to meet 
with Martin.  However in spite of two meetings designed specifically to discuss 
Equalization, the Prime Minister would not offer any special deal.196  Van Mulligen and 
the Saskatchewan Party Finance Critic, Ken Cheveldayoff, traveled to Ottawa to testify 
before the Senate Committee on National Finance.  Later in March, Calvert presented 
Saskatchewans case to the Parliamentary Committee on Fiscal Imbalance.  The Premier 
remained optimistic that the Liberals wished to close the Equalization file before an 
election.197  However, Goodale remained reluctant to negotiate a one off with 
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Saskatchewan.  In fact, Goodale told reporters that all future Equalization matters would 
probably not be decided until after the Expert Panel on Equalization delivered its 
report.198  
The summer of 2005 marked Saskatchewans centennial.  The provincial 
government hoped that the centennial fanfare and resulting national attention would 
induce the federal government to reopen Equalization negotiations.   Deputy Premier 
Clay Serby publicly urged the Prime Minister to use the centennial celebration as an 
opportunity to announce a Saskatchewan Energy Accord.199  However, the federal 
government expressed little interest in moving forward with a Saskatchewan Equalization 
arrangement. 
2.6   Open Hostilities 
By October, Calvert was clearly disappointed with the lack of progress his 
Equalization bid had made.  Calvert accused the federal government of negotiating in bad 
faith: A month and a half ago we were standing together in Saskatoon both indicating 
progress was bring made.  Since then I have seen no progress.200  In the fifth phase of 
negotiations, Calvert gave up on direct negotiations with the federal government.  Instead, 
the Saskatchewan government focussed all of its attention on the media and the public. 
Attempting to reproduce Newfoundlands successful negotiations, Calvert 
borrowed a tactic from Danny Williams.   On November 10, 2005, the Saskatchewan 
government kicked off a new advertising campaign aimed at getting the public on-
side.201  Calvert held an emergency news conference to criticize the Liberals for 
ignoring Saskatchewans cause: An observer at the new conference noted Calverts 
hostile disposition: Pastor Lorne fumed in what (for him) was a decidedly un-
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Calvertesque display of temper. 202  The Premier announced that his government would 
be running newspaper ads, an internet site, an on-line petition, and distributing thousands 
of little red flags.  Ultimately, the goal of the $300 000 campaign was to use public 
pressure to force Martin into negotiations.203  Symbolically, Raise a Flag was meant to 
separate Saskatchewans actions from the highly controversial Williams strategy of 
lowering Canadian flags.  By raising a flag, Calvert hoped to draw attention to 
Saskatchewans position without offending national sensibilities.  Calvert described his 
intentions: We are not wanting in any way to divorce ourselves from the nation or the 
future of this great nation, but we want to be a strong, strong player within Canada. 204 
The federal government did not respond favourably to the Saskatchewan 
campaign.  Goodale took particular offense at the ads: Theyve [the Saskatchewan 
Government] obviously decided that this is going to be a politically nasty campaign and 
that it is going to be directed squarely at me as an individual.205  On November 18, 
Goodale wrote a letter to the National Post.  He emphasized that the Ottawa had already 
provided Saskatchewan with compensation payments on two occasions.  Any further 
action would wait for the report of the Expert Panel on Equalization.  Moreover, 
Saskatchewans attention would be better focussed on building its economy.206  The 
federal Finance Ministers strong reaction did not concern Saskatchewan.  In fact, Van 
Mulligen was pleased that the campaign is getting under Goodales skin.207 Raise a 
Flag was discontinued when the Martin government fell on November 28, 2005.   
In retrospect, Van Mulligen concedes the Raise a Flag campaign did not achieve 
its desired results.  Saskatchewans Equalization issues are complex.  The Raise a Flag 
episode clouded the issue for the general public.  However, Van Mulligen notes that the 
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campaign was successful at enticing the Saskatchewan federal Conservative MPs to 
publicly offer their full support for the Provinces position.  The MPs are now on record 
as declaring support for excluding 100 percent of nonrenewable natural resources from 
Equalization.  These clear statements may provide future ammunition for Saskatchewans  
negotiations.208 
2.7     The Election and the Aftermath  
 On January 23, 2006, Steven Harpers Conservative Party won the federal 
election and formed a minority government.  The Conservatives assured Saskatchewan 
that they intended to exempt nonrenewable resources from the Equalization formula.  
However, Harper cautions that due to the challenges of governing in a minority, it may 
not happen right away.209  On March 23, Calvert traveled to Ottawa to meet with Prime 
Minister Harper about Equalization, among other topics.210 The Premier found the Prime 
Minister sympathetic to Saskatchewans position; however, Harper offered no time line 
as to when Equalization reforms would ensue.  
 At present, Saskatchewans Equalization case remains unresolved.  Several recent 
developments may influence the eventual outcome.  On April 6, Finance Minister 
Andrew Thompson released Saskatchewans provincial budget.  The NDP offered major 
tax cuts and program spending while still maintaining a budget surplus.  University of 
Regina professor Ken Rasmussan speculates that the good news budget will make it 
more difficult for Saskatchewan to make its Equalization case: I think the federal 
government would laugh in their face, saying listen you dont have any budget 
problems....  Talk of correcting the fiscal imbalance doesnt have the same urgency for 
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the Conservative Government.211  The provinces healthy financial situation will not 
inspire Harper to rush forward with a Saskatchewan Energy Accord. 
 Another recent development is the release of the Council of the Federations 
report on the fiscal imbalance.  The report, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, Addressing 
Canadas Fiscal Imbalance, recommends that the Equalization Program return to a 10-
province standard and continue to include 100 percent of natural resources.212  Calvert 
expressed disappointment that the report did not deal with Saskatchewans claim for an 
Energy Accord.  However, Calvert is not concerned about the position taken by the 
Council of the Federation.  As the Premier points out: This [Equalization] is a federal 
program.  What the premiers have to say about is of interest but this is a federal 
program.213  
In May 2006, the Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing, 
chaired by Al OBrien, released its recommendations in a report entitled, Achieving a 
National Purpose, Putting Equalization Back on Track.  OBriens recommendations 
included a 50 percent inclusion rate of nonrenewable natural resources; a return to 
formula-driven Equalization (the abandonment of the extra-formula approach that gave 
rise to the Offshore Accords); a ten-province standard; the simplification of the formula 
through consolidating revenue sources; and the re-emphasis of the principles behind 
Equalization.214  Saskatchewan officially opposes the Panels recommendations, 
preferring instead the full exclusion of nonrenewable natural resources.  In the end, the 
success of Saskatchewan Equalization bid will depend on the willingness of the federal 
government to negotiate. 
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3. Political Motivations 
 
3.1    The Federal Government 
Negotiating a Saskatchewan Energy Accord was not a politically attractive prospect 
for the federal government.  Ottawas reluctance can be explained by three political 
factors.  First, the electoral considerations did not work out in Saskatchewans favour.  
The Offshore Accords were initiated by a telephone call between Prime Minister Martin 
and Premier Williams in the middle of the 2004 election campaign.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia held crucial seats.  By contrast, the 
federal Liberals had little chance of increasing their seat count in Saskatchewanwhich 
promised to return a Conservative landslide.  Therefore, the provinces Equalization bid 
did not carry the promise of electoral returns for the Liberal government. 
 The second political consideration working against Saskatchewan was the 
backlash from the 2005 Offshore Accords signed with Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  
The offshore arrangements were seen as unprincipled one-offs that compromised the 
integrity of the Equalization Program.  Critics also called into question the resulting 
inequities among have not provinces.215  Several provinces vocally criticized the 
Offshore Accords.  Ontario, in particular, viewed the arrangements as direct financial 
blow to have provinces.  Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty points out that the Offshore 
Accords fundamentally reconstruct the fiscal arrangements of the country to the 
detriment of Ontario.216  While Equalization is funded out of the general revenues of the 
federal government, the program is financed by the taxpayers of have provinces. 
The third political consideration was the effect a Saskatchewan Energy Accord would 
have on the expectations of other provinces.  Ottawa justified the Newfoundland and 
 74 
 
Nova Scotia arrangements by the exceptional debt load and financial hardship of those 
provinces.  If the federal government were to extend a special arrangement to 
Saskatchewan, it would open a Pandoras Box of Equalization demands.   
In the months following the Offshore Accords, five provinces and one territory issued 
requests for a new Equalization arrangement.  Demands included $5 billion for 
Ontario;217 protection for tourism and agriculture revenue in Prince Edward Island;218 
protection for diamond revenue in the North West Territories;219 $3 billion for Quebec;220 
an increase in overall Equalization entitlements for New Brunswick;221 and an Energy 
Accord for Saskatchewan.  If the federal government bowed to Saskatchewans 
Equalization demands, the other provinces would be sure to follow.  Fearing a 
Saskatchewan Accord would result in the fragmentation of Equalization into twelve 
separate arrangements, the Martin Government declined to grant the province an 
Equalization agreement.    
 The Harper government faces a different set of political pressures.  Due to the 
views of Harper and his close circle of advisors, the Conservatives are more likely to 
deliver a Saskatchewan Energy Accord or even extend Saskatchewans demands to the 
entire program.222  During the elections of 2004 and 2006 the Conservative Party 
platform included a promise to return to a ten-province standard and eliminate 
nonrenewable natural resources from the formula.223  However, political pressures may 
work against Saskatchewans cause.  Equalization is a highly controversial issue among 
provinces.  In a minority government situation the Conservatives may be reluctant to 
pursue the divisive issue.   
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3.2  Saskatchewan 
For the Saskatchewan government, the political motivations for pursuing an Energy 
Accord are straightforward.  Once Courchenes paper became public, the government 
was forced to take action to recover clawbacks that exceeded 100 percent.  After the 
federal government gave Saskatchewan first the $120 million and then the $367 million 
payments to compensate for the unfair clawbacks, the province decided to expand its 
Equalization battle by asking for an Energy Accord.   
The public struggle that led to the signing of the 2005 Offshore Accords significantly 
boosted the popularity of Premiers Hamm and Williams.  Calvert had an opportunity to 
create a similar wave of public support by staging a Saskatchewan Equalization fight.  In 
particular, the timing and nature of the March 2004 Saskatchewan advertising campaign 
suggests that the governments focus was on building popularity as much as securing a 
new Equalization arrangement.  The federal government responded quickly to the 
original Saskatchewan grievances prompted by Courchenes paper.  The confiscatory 
clawback came to light in February 2004, and by the beginning of March the federal 
government had already offered a payment of compensation.  Instead of continuing to 
work directly with Martin and Goodale to find a more long-term solution, the 
Saskatchewan government chose to run a newspaper campaign criticizing Ottawa for the 
provinces Equalization problems. Such actions are usually reserved for mobilizing 
public pressure on an unwilling federal government.  The federal government, however, 
seemed ready to negotiate.  Therefore, it appears that Calvert was motivated by public 
support as much as Saskatchewans Equalization concerns.  Moreover, with a bad news 
budget scheduled to be delivered at the end of March,224 speculation arose that the ads 
were merely an attempt to distract the public in order to deflect blame for the budget.225   
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Then Finance Minister Van Mulligen offers an alternative explanation.  He suggests 
that after the $120 payment issued to Saskatchewan in March, there was a sense that the 
federal government was finished negotiating.  While Ottawa referred to the payment as 
interim, Saskatchewan found no evidence to suggest that Ottawa was willing to take 
further action on the matter.  Therefore, the ads were intended to keep the issue on the 
public agenda and in the priorities of the federal government.226 
Regardless of the intent of the March ad campaign, popular support is crucial to the 
NDP government that has a majority of only two seats.  Equalization is a popular cause.  
The Calvert Government built an all-party coalition to present its case to Ottawa and to 
its residents. It is difficult for the public to fault a government that is lobbying for the 
provinces fair share.  The Equalization seems to have been an ideal opportunity for 
Lorne Calvert to earn some much-needed points in the popularity polls. 
 
4. Conclusion 
There are a few interesting points to highlight about the Saskatchewan case.  In 
regards to the position of the Martin government, hindsight renders the Liberal reasoning 
inconsistent.  Throughout the negotiations, Goodale and Martin insisted that the 
Equalization Program needed to be dealt with holistically.  The appointment of the 
OBrien panel was an attempt to find program-wide solutions.  Goodale publicly stated 
that Ottawa was not willing to negotiate side deals.  However, the February 2005 
Offshore Accords are precisely the kind of back of the envelope 227 arrangement that 
Goodale had previously rejected for Saskatchewan.  This reversal seems to indicate that 
political factors  and not principled reasoningwere the predominant considerations 
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why Newfoundland and Nova Scotia received special treatment and Saskatchewan did 
not. 
   On the part of the Saskatchewan government, there are two interesting points.  The 
first point is that Calvert actually increased his demands after Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia got their Offshore Accords.  Prior to February 2005, Calvert was merely seeking 
the correction of the elements of the formula that resulted in the confiscatory clawback 
(100 percent and higher).  In addition, Saskatchewan wanted the extension of the Generic 
Solution to protect 30 percent of the provinces oil and gas revenue.  It emphasized the 
problems of the FPS (see section 1.1.1), the unfair effects of the Generic Solution (see 
section 1.1.2), and the problem of the disincentive (see section 1.1.3).   At this point, all 
of Saskatchewans demands could have been met by amendments inside the existing 
Equalization Program.  After the Offshore Accords were signed, Saskatchewan added a 
new demand. The province now seeks a bilateral Energy Accord outside of the 
Equalization formula.  The government has built an argument based on provincial equity 
(see section 1.1.4).  The shift in focus is probably an attempt to maximize the benefits for 
Saskatchewan.  It reflects a strategy based on pragmatism more than ideology or 
principles. 
The final point to highlight about Saskatchewan is its strong reliance on the appeal for 
equity.  Since the signing of the Atlantic Accords in 1985 and 1986, Saskatchewans 
energy revenues had been receiving different treatment than those of Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia.  Instead of looking to correct this inequity, the federal government 
exacerbated it with the 2005 Offshore Accords.  In terms of equity and federalism, 
Saskatchewan had little choice but to raise the issue and seek a return to fairness.228 
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Equalization has become an essential element of federal provincial fiscal 
arrangements in Canada.  Its importance has increased over the years so that it is 
now an integral part of the economic and social fabric of the country.  In fact, its 
entrenchment in the Constitution in 1982 signaled its importance to the Canadian 
federation.  Today, Canadians not only accept the principle of Equalization, they 
embrace it because it ensures all Canadians, regardless of where they live, can 
expect similar levels of services from their provincial governments.  This provides 
a very significant contribution toward maintaining equity in our society.229 
 
 
Equalization is not an ordinary federal program.  It is a base for Canadas regime 
of fiscal federalism.  However, the current Program seems to be in a state of disarray.  
The examination of the cases of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan reveals 
many problems with Equalization.  These cases highlight the cleavages among the 
provinces as well as the inadequacy of the current reform process.  This chapter will take 
a final look at the positions, politics and processes that are found in the cases of 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan.  Several interesting observations can be 
made by comparing these cases.  Finally, this chapter will examine the future of the 
Equalization Program for Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan, as well as for 
the rest of Canada.  
 
 
1. Positions 
There are several notable differences between the positions of Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia on one hand, and Saskatchewan on the other.  The most important difference 
relates to timing.  Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have been fighting for control and 
retention of their offshore oil revenues since each province joined confederation.  
Newfoundland in particular views its Terms of Union as something unique from those of 
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the rest of the provinces.  Newfoundlands Terms of Union included special protection of 
local industries from federal actions (Term 46),  arrangements for Newfoundland the 
Newfoundland fishing industry (Term 22), and special provisions for offshore mining 
(Term 37), and special transfer payments (Term 23).230  Newfoundland has traditionally 
viewed its place in confederation as encompassing a kind of special circumstances by 
which differential treatment is required from the federal government.  Newfoundland 
nationalism entered a new era with the election of Brian Peckford in 1979.  Premier 
Peckford promoted nationalist sentiments based on cultural uniqueness and historic 
economic disadvantage.231     This philosophy was highlighted in the negotiation of the 
1985 and 1986 Atlantic Accords.  These Accords demonstrate long-held commitment to 
protecting those provinces energy revenues from the Equalization clawback.  Once the 
offset provision (which provided payments to offset the clawback on offshore revenue) 
was nearing expiration in early 2000, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia revisited the same 
positions of the 1980s.  Their positions remained consistent throughout the negotiation 
processes; both in the 1980s and in 2004-2005.  In fact, during the negotiations leading 
up to the 2005 Offshore Accords, Premiers Williams and Hamm emphasized the purpose 
and intent of the original Atlantic Accords.232 
 Conversely, the Saskatchewan position has undergone several modifications since 
the 1980s.  Saskatchewans concerns date back to 1982 when the formula was changed 
from a five province standard to a ten province standard including 100 percent of natural 
resource revenue.  Saskatchewan advocated a ten province standard with only 20 percent 
inclusion of natural resources (NAS-20 proposal).233  Saskatchewan maintained its 
preference for a ten province standard throughout the 1990s.234 
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 Saskatchewans focus first shifted shortly after the release of Thomas 
Courchenes paper in 2004.  The province immediately adopted the position that 
clawbacks near or exceeding 100 percent were unfair.  In addition, Saskatchewan sought 
the protection of 30 percent of its energy revenue (down from 80 percent that was 
advocated in the NAS-20 proposal of 1982).235   
 The Saskatchewan position shifted again immediately following the signing of the 
2005 Offshore Accords.  At this point, Saskatchewan began demanding its own energy 
accord with provisions similar to those attained by Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  
Instead of settling for a 30 percent protection from the clawback, the province wanted to 
protect 100 percent of its oil and natural gas revenues.236   
 The inconsistency can be explained by the focus and motivation of Saskatchewan, 
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  For the two Atlantic Provinces, the position was based 
on an unwavering principle that the provinces must be in control and benefit from their 
own resource industry.  Saskatchewan, however, focused on matters of equity.  It 
modified its positions to emphasize the disparate treatment between offshore oil and 
Saskatchewans energy revenue.   
 The lack of consistency in Saskatchewans position may also be explained by an 
emphasis on expediency rather than principle.  While Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 
were deeply committed to the principles of their positions, Saskatchewan was willing to 
be flexible in order to reap the greatest benefit.  At present, Saskatchewans pragmatic 
positioning has not yielded the desired energy accord.  Some political factors likely 
contributed to Saskatchewans lack of success. 
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2.     Politics 
 The federal governments electoral concerns were the most prominent political 
factor that influenced negotiations in the cases of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and 
Saskatchewan.   In the cases of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, the basis of the Offshore 
Accords was formed during the June 5, 2004 phone call between Prime Minister Paul 
Martin and Premier Danny Williams in which the two purportedly reached a verbal 
agreement regarding Equalization and offshore oil.  As explained in Chapter 3, the phone 
call occurred in the midst of a close federal election campaign.  The federal Liberals had 
a significant electoral stake in the swing ridings in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.  
Once the promises were made, Martin tried to distance himself from his commitment.  
Signing a bilateral agreement was not popular with the other provinces.  Moreover, the  
one off approach was not the preferred method in dealing with the problems of the 
Equalization Program.  However after significant prodding from Premiers Williams and 
Hamm, the federal government conceded to terms set out by Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia.  It did so, in part, because Liberal MPs from the two provinces faced significant 
pressure from their constituents with an election pending.237  The Liberal government had 
considerable interest invested in maintaining the favour of voters in Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia. 
 By contrast, Saskatchewan did not offer the same kind of electoral enticement.  
The Liberals held only one seat in Saskatchewanthat of Finance Minister Ralph 
Goodale and the party was relatively confident in the reelection of the minister.  
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Moreover, other provinces such as Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Quebec were 
opposed to any more accords.  Equalization is funded by the taxpayers of all provinces.  
Therefore, when one province increases its equalization entitlement, the increase is 
funded by the tax dollars of other provinces.   
    Saskatchewans current Minister of Government Relations, Harry Van Mulligen 
suggests that Newfoundland and Nova Scotias energy arrangements, and 
Saskatchewans lack thereof, amount to a cold calculation for seats on the part of the 
federal Liberal government.238  If Van Mulligens assessment is correct, then the formula-
based approach was sacrificed for pure electoral calculations.   
 The federal Conservatives also faced electoral pressures.  During the 2004 and 
2006 federal election campaigns, the Conservative Partys election campaign included 
promises to eliminate nonrenewable natural resources from the Equalization formula and 
returning to a ten province standard.  Moreover, the Conservative candidates from 
Saskatchewan made Equalization a cornerstone of their election campaign.  
Saskatchewan MP Tom Lukiwski called Equalization the largest single [election] issue 
that people in Saskatchewan should be concerned about.239   However, during the 
Harper Governments first session, there was no move to implement the Equalization 
promises.  
 In June 2006, Harper became increasingly noncommittal about his governments 
Equalization intentions.240  In an interview with a Calgary radio station, Harper clarified 
that the fulfillment of his election promise was merely his preference and not a 
guarantee.241  This is a clear departure from his former commitment to fix 
Saskatchewans Equalization problems.  Later that month, federal Finance Minister Jim 
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Flaherty stated that The government of Canada has not taken a position on (how to fix 
equalization) and that continues to be our position now  that we havent taken one.242 
 Regional political pressures undoubtedly contributed to the Harper governments 
change of heart.  In Harpers words: my government is trying to balance competing 
demands among provinces and quite frankly I dont think the details of the technical 
calculations are of much interest to most people.243  Harpers reference to trying to 
balance demands was an acknowledgement that the Equalization commitments in the 
Conservative election platform have little support outside of Saskatchewan and Alberta.   
Ontario vocally opposes any reforms that result in a cash infusion into the 
Equalization Program.  Premier McGuinty points out that if the Equalization reforms 
proceed, Ontario stands to lose $1 billion.244  Because Ontario has little nonrenewable 
natural resource revenue, the elimination of resources from the formula would elevate the 
province even further above the have line.  As a result, Ontario taxpayers would be 
contributing an even greater proportion of money to the Program.  Premier McGuinty has 
traveled Canada over the summer of 2006, trying to find allies for the Ontario position.245 
Similarly, Quebec would stand to lose a portion of Equalization transfers should 
the Conservative proposal be implemented.246  Again, this phenomenon is due to the low 
portion of provincial revenue derived from nonrenewable natural resources.  New 
Brunswick and Manitoba share similar circumstances.  Harper stands to lose a significant 
portion of provincial support if he carries out his Equalization commitments.  A Leader 
Post editorial describes the Prime Ministers position as follows:   
Harper might believe he can afford the price of upsetting the West on resources in 
favour of pleasing vote-rich Ontario and Quebec, but it will be the first major 
campaign promise broken by a man who insists Canadians can trust him.247 
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The Conservative government is in a difficult political position.  The Conservative Party 
website still says we will remove non-renewable natural resource revenue from the 
equalization formula248  However, regional political demands may trump policy 
preference.   
 For Saskatchewan, the prospects of a satisfactory Equalization arrangement in the 
near future are diminishing.  The 2006 annual Council of the Federation summer meeting 
was held July 26 to 28.  The premiers attempted to come to consensus on Equalization 
reform and the fiscal imbalance in order to make a stronger case to the federal 
government.  However, at the end of the meeting, there was still no agreement.  Alberta 
Premier Ralph Klein noted that the provinces will likely never reach consensus when it 
comes to Equalization.  Instead of producing a consensus the talks were pitting the 
provinces against one another.249  Premier Calvert downplayed the setback, pointing out 
that while it is preferable for the provinces to find a common position, ultimately all 
decisions made regarding Canadas Equalization Program will be up to the federal 
government. 250  However, if Harpers resolve is in fact weakening, Saskatchewan has 
few allies in its Equalization battle.  The political climate has shifted against 
Saskatchewans position. 
 
3. Process 
In the long run, the element of these cases that will prove the most important for 
Canada is the process by which the Equalization arrangements were negotiated.  The 
Offshore Accords and the subsequent events have put considerable strain on the Canadian 
framework for fiscal federalism and regional sharing.  As noted in previous chapters, the 
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Equalization Program has been traditionally renewed at five year intervals.  There have 
been several occurrences of minor adjustments and interim amendments that have been 
made between renewals.  However, none of these adjustments were as large or as 
controversial as those made in the February 2005 Offshore Accords. 
The Offshore Accords were bilateral arrangements that dealt exclusively with 
Equalization provisions for two particular provinces.  These were different from the 1986 
and 1986 Atlantic Accords that focused on revenue sharing, jurisdiction, and control over 
the entire offshore industry.  The 2005 arrangements specifically focused on Equalization.  
They fundamentally altered the makeup of the Program without consultation with the 
other provinces.  Moreover, the Offshore Accords affect change outside the Equalization 
formula.  Whereas all other provinces must accept the transfers as calculated by the 
formula, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia have obtained a completely separate side 
arrangement. 
The process that led to the Offshore Accords, was highly ad hoc and arbitrary.  The 
deals were initiated by a telephone promise in the midst of a difficult election campaign.  
The negotiations that ensued appeared to be motivated by expediency rather than 
principle.  The Martin Government proceeded with the goal of minimizing the cost and 
size of the Offshore Accords.  Newfoundland and Nova Scotia proceeded with the 
intention of securing the complete protection of all offshore revenues from the 
Equalization clawback.  The result was an adversarial process that was driven more by 
electoral political concerns than by the Equalization formula. 
This process departed from the tradition of amending the Equalization Program 
through changes in the formula that applies to all provinces equally.  The federal 
 88 
 
governments lack of respect for the long-term implications for the formula raises 
concerns about the future integrity of Equalization in Canada.  Robin Boadway points out 
that the Offshore Accords will have undesirable future implications for fiscal federalism:   
The idea of introducing special measures to help special provinces for particular ad 
hoc reasons sets [a] bad precedent.  I think that the most recent deal that was struck 
with Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, whatever you may think of its benefits, was 
what really set the cat among the pigeons.  I think we have to get the process back 
to one where theres predictability, where its driven by a formula, where decisions 
are taken with a long-term perspective in mind, and where we worry about the 
irreversibility of decisions that are taken for short-run expediency.251 
 
The reliance on ad hoc bilateral arrangements to deal with the complaints of individual 
provinces not only threatens the principles of the Equalization Program in the short term, 
it also opens the door to further degeneration of Canadas regime of regional sharing.  
Professor Ronald Watts expresses his concerns as follows: 
Once you get into ad hoc judgments theres no end to the special pleading that 
different governments will bring forth, and so on.  And it seems to me that those 
agreements [the 2005 Offshore Accords] have raised the issue of special pleading by 
other provinces, arguing that they are now disadvantaged by those arrangements.252 
 
The Offshore Accords set a dangerous precedent for future changes to Equalization.  
Abandoning the formula-based inclusive approach leaves Equalization vulnerable to the 
whims of any province that gains political clout with the federal government.  If this 
precedent prevails Canadas Equalization Program may lose the credibility that is 
required to continue facilitating a system of regional redistribution. 
 
4. The Future of Equalization 
4.1   Newfoundland & Nova Scotia 
The Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 2005 Offshore Accords were signed with the 
Liberal federal government.  With the election of Stephen Harpers Conservatives in 
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January 2006, the exact terms of the arrangements may be in jeopardy.  In March 2006, 
federal Finance Minister Jim Flaherty suggested that the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia 
deals could be revoked.253  He pointed out that: right now we have two equalization 
formulas that the previous government is firmly committed to.  We cant be firmly 
committed to two [E]qualization programs.254  However, since Flaherty made the above 
statements, a consensus seems to have been reached among governments regarding future 
of the 2005 Offshore Accords.  Even Flaherty changed his tune saying that media 
reports suggest that the government is considering scrapping the offshore agreements 
reached last year with Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador  This is both 
factually incorrect and misleading.255  The current federal position supports the 
maintenance of the Offshore Accords.256  However, the sentiments from Ottawa indicates 
that while the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia agreements will be tolerated, extra-
formula arrangements are not in store for the future. 
4.2   Saskatchewan 
Unlike Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan does not have a signed energy 
agreement with the federal government.  Moreover, the present political climate is not 
conducive to a Saskatchewan Accord.  The biggest obstacle Saskatchewan faces is the 
unfavorable chronology of events.  When Newfoundland and Nova Scotia signed their 
Accords with the federal government in 2005, there were no pre-existing Equalization 
deals under the scrutiny of the rest of the country.  While the negotiation of the Offshore 
Accords drew the objections of several provincesmost notably Ontarioit was not 
until after the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia agreements were signed that Equalization 
became a primary focus for the entire country.  For the most part, the Offshore Accords 
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received a negative response from the provinces.  With the exception of Saskatchewan, 
which wanted to use the Accords as a basis for negotiating its own energy agreement, the 
provinces viewed the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia arrangements as a threat to the 
Equalization Program.257  The Martin government endured much criticism from 
opposition federal parties, provincial governments, media, and academics for the process 
that led to the Offshore Accords.  While the Harper Government has promised to 
maintain the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia deals, it seems less willing to participate in 
the political maneuvering that would be involved in negotiating a Saskatchewan Accord.   
Aside from negotiating a bilateral energy agreement with the federal government, 
Saskatchewans alternative strategy involves lobbying to remove nonrenewable natural 
resources from the Equalization Program and returning to a ten province standard.  The 
combined effect of these two amendments would be equivalent to an energy accord for 
Saskatchewan because it would remove oil and natural gas revenues from the formula, 
thereby eliminating the clawback.  While Stephen Harper maintains that his preference is 
to act on these amendments, the realities of leading a minority government may make this 
difficult.   
Further impairing Saskatchewans case is the discord among the provinces on the 
matter of Equalization.  Between 2004 and 2006 the Premiers have met several times to 
discuss Equalization.  At the Council of the Federation meeting in July 2006, the 
premiers finally conceded that a consensus is unattainable. A Leader Post article 
summarized the negotiations: It was Mission: Impossible from the beginning  even 
Tom Cruise couldnt have pulled the provincial premiers into a unified fighting force on 
Equalization.258  Newfoundland Premier Danny Williams conceded that the opportunity 
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to find agreement had passed: those irreconcilable differences just cant be 
reconciled.259  Even more divisive are allegations that Quebec has deliberately 
sabotaged the Equalization discussions.  Following the Council of the Federation meeting, 
an Ontario official accused Quebec of playing political games. The official suggested that 
Premier Jean Charest preferred to negotiate with the Prime Minister without the rest of 
the provinces.260 
With the high degree of discord among provinces, Prime Minister Harper has a 
difficult task in finding an acceptable solution for the Equalization Program conundrum.  
In the end, Saskatchewans only major ally is Albertawhich would like to see 
nonrenewable resources excluded in order to keep the overall costs of the Equalization 
Program lower.261  In fact, Premier Klein declared that Alberta would no longer 
participate in the Equalization Program if its energy resources were included in the 
program.262  Klein and Calvert insist that Harper must keep his promise to exclude 
natural resources.263  However, Albertas support may not be enough for Saskatchewan to 
sell its case to the federal government.  At present, the prospect of a Saskatchewan 
Accord or equivalent amendments to the Equalization Program, is precarious at best. 
4.3    The Equalization Program 
Most governments agree that the process and substance of the 2005 Offshore Accords 
were an aberration that should not be repeated.  However, Canadian governments must 
deal with the Equalization Program that remains following the implementation of the 
Offshore Accords.  Conservative MP Judy Wasylycia-Leis poses an important question: 
Given the fact that bad deals were struck with Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, how 
do you handle this situation before we get to the point where we have to sit down 
again and figure out a new program with a new formula.  How do we handle it now 
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so that we can avoid everything coming undone to the point where there is nothing 
left to fix?264 
 
All governments recognize that the Equalization Program is inadequate in its current 
configuration.  Reforming the Program is on the immediate national agenda.  However, 
Equalizationalong with the closely related issues of regional sharing and the fiscal 
imbalanceis one of the most divisive issues in Canada at present.  The process of 
Equalization reform faced many roadblocks.  Every time a solution is crafted that 
satisfies the demands of one province, several new problems are created for others.  
 In the past, the federal government has often imposed amendments and reforms 
notwithstanding provincial objections.  Saskatchewan is currently pushing Harpers 
government to do just that.  Premier Calvert has repeatedly emphasized that in the end, it 
does not matter what his provincial and territorial counterparts think, Equalization reform 
falls to the federal government.265  However, the minority Conservative government must 
consider the political implications of any decision it makes.  Thomas Courchene 
highlights Harpers dilemma in the following sentences:  
Even though equalization is a federal program, Mr. Harper cannot afford to ruffle too 
many feathers in Ontario and Quebec, where his support is most tenuous.  Nor can he 
afford to alienate his base in Alberta, which steadfastly opposes the direct use of 
resource revenues to fund equalization.266 
 
In the past, both the Martin and the Harper governments were able to postpone dealing 
with the issue under the pretext of waiting for the report of the OBrien Expert Panel on 
Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing.  Now that OBrien has released his 
findings (May 2006), Stephen Harper will be forced to address Equalization come the fall 
2006 sitting of the House. 
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 The federal governments political options are limited.  Harper must maintain the 
Equalization formula while still satisfying the demands of the provinces.  Perhaps the 
best compromise would involve a page from every provinces wish list.  First, the five 
province standard would be replaced by a ten province standard.  This would eliminate 
the inequitable treatment between standard and non-standard provinces as well as project 
a more realistic standard for the measurement of fiscal capacity.   
Second, the rate of inclusion for nonrenewable natural resources would be reduced to 
50 percent.  Chapter 2 discusses why including 100 percent of nonrenewable resources in 
the Equalization formula creates problems of perverse incentives and confiscatory 
clawbacks.  However, completely eliminating these revenue sources from Equalization 
would significantly decrease the effectiveness of the Program.  Many provincial 
governments generate significant revenue from natural resources.  For example, in the 
2005-2006 Saskatchewan budget estimates nonrenewable natural resources comprised 
nearly a quarter of the provinces own source revenue.267 Therefore, if these resources are 
not measured at all the effectiveness of Equalization will be endangered.  The 
Constitution states that the purpose of Equalization is to ensure that provincial 
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public 
services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. 268  Since 1967, Canadas 
Equalization Program has sought to fulfill this purpose by equalizing the fiscal capacity 
of the provinces by way of the RTS approach.  However, it would be impossible to 
measure and equalize fiscal capacities if a significant portion of this capacity.  Therefore, 
it is better to deal with the problems created by nonrenwable natural resources by 
including them at a rate of 50 percent as opposed to eliminating them entirely.  Moreover, 
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the results of including 100 percent of natural resources paired with a ten province 
standard would increase the total cost of the Equalization Program unacceptably (by 
allowing all of Albertas oil and natural gas revenues to enter the formula).269  If 
Equalization transfers were increased to adopt 100 percent inclusion of natural resources, 
Ontarios fears that the cost of the entire program would increase would be realized.  
However, if Equalization reverts back to a ten province standard with 100 percent 
inclusion of natural resources, Ontario would become a have not province.  Historically, 
this condition was deemed unacceptable and the Program was amended to ameliorate the 
situation.  Instead, only including half of nonrenwable resources will control the overall 
cost of the Program and avoid making Ontario an Equalization recipient.  
Both of the above amendments are recommended in the Expert Panel on Equalization 
and Territorial Financing final report entitled: Achieving a National Purpose: Putting 
Equalization Back on Track.270  Should these recommendations be implemented, no 
single province would be happy with the outcome.  However, if it were indeed impossible 
to find accordance among the provinces, perhaps if every province were a little unhappy, 
then the right balance would have been struck.  More importantly, these amendments do 
not create any significant losers.  In other words, no province stands to lose a large 
proportion of their current Equalization transfer under the proposed regime.  The 
following table demonstrates the effects that the amendments would have on each 
province: 
 
Formula to Formula Comparison for 2007-2008 
$million 
 
 NL PE NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC 
Current 
Formula 
587 282 1,363 1,417 6,273 0 1,720 0 0 35 
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New 
Formula 
482 286 1,462 1,462 6,926 0 1,789 156 0 0 
           
Changes -105 4 99 45 653 0 69 156 0 -35 
 
Source:  Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing,  Achieving a National Purpose: Putting Equalization Back 
on Track, Ottawa: Government of Canada, 16. 
 
 
These results would make it appear that Newfoundland would lose considerable funding.  
However, these calculations use the numbers included in the Equalization formula.  The 
effects of the 2005 Offshore Accords are not considered.  Therefore, if the Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia arrangements are indeed upheld, Newfoundlands projected losses under 
the proposed formula would be recovered by offset payments under the Offshore Accords.   
 The Offshore Accords are an annoyance that appear to be a fact of Canadian 
Equalization for the next ten to twelve years. However, it is important not to allow this 
unfortunate condition to lead to the complete abandonment of the Equalization process.  
Should Equalization be allowed to disintegrate, the ties that bind the provinces together 
into one fiscal and social union will begin to break down.  Equalization is a program that 
is not comme les autres.  This fact was verified in 1982 when Equalization was 
entrenched into the Canadian constitution.  Indeed, Equalization personifies a 
commitment to fairness, sharing and respect. Equalization is a pan-Canadian pledge to 
the idea of a national social citizenship.  Consequently, when Equalization is not 
functioning, an element of Canadian citizenship is endangered.   
Since 2004, governments have not treated Equalization with the care and respect 
that the program demands.  Political considerations and federal frugality have resulted in 
program alternations that are eroding the efficacy of Equalization.  Year-to-year changes 
to Equalization have been implemented through the budgetary process without any 
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adequate consideration of long-term impacts.271    Richard Bird articulates the exigency 
of the matter:  It has been said, and it is true to some extent, that equalization is the glue 
that holds the country together.  Improperly used, pushed too far, the glue may turn into a 
solvent.  Thats what we are afraid of.272  If Equalization is allowed to deteriorate 
beyond repair, the repercussions will affect the very core of Canadian values and unity. 
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